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Four Score of Liberty, Privacy and Equality
FRANCISCO VALDES*
Lawrence was decided exactly eighty years after the first liberty-privacy case,
and in the midst of a fierce kulturkampf striving to roll back civil rights
generally. In this Article, Professor Valdes situates Lawrence in the context
formed both by these four score of liberty-privacy jurisprudence that precede it
as well as by the politics of backlash that envelop it today. After canvassing the
landmark rulings from Meyer in 1923 to Lawrence in 2003, in the process
acknowledging both their emancipatory strengths and their traditionalist
instrumentalism, Professor Valdes concludes that Lawrence is a long overdue
recognition of the prior precedents and their actual outcomes. This belated
recognition, entailing a repudiation of Bowers, reflects similar weaknesses and
strengths but also effectively sets the stage for a resumption ofjurisprudential
developments under the Fourteenth Amendment interrupted by that 1986
anomaly. These pending developments, Professor Valdes concludes, logically
and substantively point to the formal recognition of the individual right already
protected under the eight decades of liberty, privacy and equality law preceding
Lawrence. That right, Professor Valdes states, is properly denominated as the
right to sexual self-determination, embedded principally in the liberty text of the
Due Process Clause and buttressed by other provisions or sources of
constitutional law.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's 2003 ruling in Lawrence v. Texasl
demands attention in no small measure because it appears freighted with so much,
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to the five justices of the Supreme Court whose courage in Lawrence v. Texas secured the
repudiation of Bowers v. Hardwick, and with the student editors and faculty at Ohio State
University Moritz College of Law for conducting the symposium that permits us to assess the
implications of this long-overdue act. In particular, I thank Editors Patrick Brodhead, Chris
Geidner, and Chad Kaldor for their support in helping to produce an insightful contribution to
this symposium, Professor Marc Spindelman for conceptualizing and organizing the
symposium, and Dean Nancy Rogers for providing material and institutional support to these
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and yet with so little, all at once. This duality stems in part from the apparent
ambivalence in its elaboration of the "extent of the liberty interest at stake" in that
case, a duality seen in the juxtaposition of passages signaling a potential
recognition of the social value of the inchoate right to sexual self-determination
with passages repeating and reifying traditionalist restrictions on sexual desires
and relations. Most notably, in discussing "the right to define one's own concept
of.. . human life," the Lawrence Court declares that: "Persons in a homosexual
relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons
do." 2 Then it quickly adds that this case did not, after all, involve "public conduct
.... [or] whether the government must give formal recognition to any
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter."'3 During this discussion, the
Court begins with an expansive invocation of the right's "spatial and more
transcendent dimensions ' 4 yet ends with a reminder that the case involved only
"two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual
practices common to a homosexual lifestyle." 5 While inviting controversy and
contestation over ultimate meanings, this apparent ambivalence at a minimum
establishes that adult same-sex couples may now "choose to enter upon [their]
relationships in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still
retain their dignity as free persons." 6 Lawrence thereby moves sexual minorities
into an interstitial place in constitutional law-from the status of formal outlaws
but shy of the status of formal recognition; a traditionally subordinated social
group now to be tolerated, but not necessarily accepted. Lawrence, therefore,
obviously need not entail an affirmation of pluralism as public policy in the uses
of law to regulate and nourish or suppress intimate associations. It obviously need
not produce any substantive change in judicial understanding, nor in the actual
application, of other homophobic laws, as the lower courts' actions already have
amply demonstrated. 7
1 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
2 Id. at 574.
3 Id at 578.
4 Id. at 562.
5 Id at 578.
6 1d at 567.
7 Both the commentary and case law issued during the brief period since the ruling was
announced illustrate how Lawrence already has come to represent all and nothing. See, e.g.,
Gary D. Allison, Sanctioning Sodomy: The Supreme Court Liberates Gay Sex and Limits State
Power to Vindicate the Moral Sentiments of the People, 39 TULSA. L.J. 95 (2003); Paris R.
Baldacci, Lawrence and Garner: The Love (or at Least Sexual Attraction) that Finally Dared
Speak Its Name, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN's L.J. 289 (2004); Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the
Fundamental Right to Marry: Same-Sex Marriage in the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88
MINN. L. REV. 1184 (2004); Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution:
Lawrence v. Texas, Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 03-13 (July 16, 2003),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=422564 (last visited Oct. 19, 2004); Dale Carpenter, Is
Lawrence Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1140 (2004); Mary Anne Case, Of "This" and
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"That" in Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 SuP. CT. REV. 75 (2003); Benjamin J. Cooper, Loose Not
the Floodgates, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 311 (2004); Paisley Currah, The Other "Sex" in
Lawrence v. Texas, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 321 (2004); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Lawrence's Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review to Lower the Stakes of Identity
Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021 (2004); James E. Fleming, Lawrence's Republic, 39 TULSA
L.J. 563 (2004); Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (2004); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for
Lawmaking: Before and Afier Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233 (2004); Bernard E.
Harcourt, "You Are Entering a Gay and Lesbian-Free Zone": On the Radical Dissents of
Justice Scalia and Other (Post-) Queers, 94 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 503 (2004); Wilson
Huhn, The Jurisprudential Revolution: Unlocking Human Potential in Grutter and Lawrence,
12 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 65 (2003); Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L.
REV. 1103 (2004); Pamela S. Karlan, Loving Lawrence, Stanford Public Law Working Paper
No. 85. (Mar. 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-=512662 (last visited Oct. 19, 2004);
Nancy J. Knauer, Lawrence v. Texas: When "Profound and Deep Convictions" Collide With
Liberty Interests, 10 CARDOzO WOMEN'S L.J. 325 (2004); Andrew Koppelman, Lawrence's
Penumbra, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1171 (2004); Arnold H. Loewy, Morals Legislation and the
Establishment Clause, 55 ALA. L. REV. 159 (2003); Nelson Robert Lund & John 0. McGinnis,
Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, MICH. L. REV., forthcoming, available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-534343 (last visited Oct. 19, 2004); Brett H. McDonnell, Is Incest
Next?, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 337 (2004); Miranda Oshige McGowan, From Outlaws to
Ingroup: Romer, Lawrence, and the Inevitable Normativity of Group Recognition, 88 MINN. L.
REV. 1312 (2004); Richard D. Mohr, The Shag-a-Delic Supreme Court: "Anal Sex,'"
"Mystery, " "Destiny, " and the "Transcendent" in Lawrence v. Texas, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S
L.J. 365 (2004); Ruthann Robson, The Missing Word in Lawrence v. Texas, 10 CARDOZO
WOMEN'S L.J. 397 (2004); Andrew J. Seligsohn, Choosing Liberty Over Equality and
Sacrificing Both: Equal Protection and Due Process in Lawrence v. Texas, 10 CARDOZO
WOMEN'S L.J. 411 (2004); Edward Stein, Introducing Lawrence v. Texas: Some Background
and a Glimpse of the Future, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 263 (2004); Mark Strasser,
Lawrence, Same-Sex Marriage and the Constitution: What is Protected and Why?, 38 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 667 (2004); Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy,
Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, (U. Chi. L. & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 196, 2003),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=450160 (last visited Oct. 19, 2004); Laurence H. Tribe,
Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" that Dare not Speak its Name, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 1893 (2004); Jami Weinstein & Tobyn DeMarco, Challenging Dissent: The Ontology and
Logic of Lawrence v. Texas, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 423 (2004); David Zucco,
Introduction, Symposium: Gay Rights After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1017 (2004).
The former and hopeful aspects of this remarkable ruling also are manifest in the joyous
personal reactions from scholars and others around the country to the majority opinion's
potential, including those moved to rare tears by this unexpected nod of respect from an
institution that had become increasingly hostile over the past two decades. See, e.g., Richard
Kim, Comment, U.S. Supreme Court Overturns Texas'Anti-Sodomy Laws, THE NATION, July
21, 2003, at 5 (reporting "that gay people took to the streets in pride parades to celebrate the
Court's repudiation of Bowers"). I understand this reaction because I grew up under Bowers'
shadow and never thought I would see the day of its repudiation; I remain amazed and
delighted by the experience of it. The latter is personified by the generation of sodomites and
Queers whose lives flourished despite the formal outlawry that Bowers incited and licensed, in
the process illustrating law's limits, including those that attend lawmaking by judicial fiat. A
nationwide survey taken three years after Bowers was decided found many stable same-sex
2004] 1343
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This apparent ambivalence, however, also reflects the gains and
shortcomings of the principal trio of precedents that Lawrence expressly affirms:
Griswold v. Connecticut,8 Eisenstadt v. Baird9 and Carey v. Population Services
relationships among Queer sodomites that resembled "traditional marriage" arrangements, in
stark contrast to the justices' contrary assertions in their Bowers opinion. Couples Report Solid,
Long-Lasting Relationships, PARTNERS, May-June 1990, at 1, available at
http://www.buddybuddy.com/toc.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2004) (reporting the findings of a
national survey of same-sex couples tallying nearly 1749 responses, at that time "the largest
such project in a decade"). More recently, another study of same-sex couples, this time in the
nation's capital, concluded that cross-sex unions "may have a lot to learn from gays." Peter
Freiberg, Couples Study Shows Strengths, WASH. BLADE, Mar. 16, 2001, at 1 (summarizing the
findings of a 12-year research study comparing same-sex and cross-sex couples). I know this
particular social group, for I have been one of them during Bowers' seventeen-year reign.
This Article, in the limited space and time it allows, recognizes both the promise and warts
of liberty-privacy as articulated by the judges in the eighty years between Meyer and Lawrence,
even as the heterosexist status quo continues to operate fully in law and society. See, e.g., In re
Kandu, 2004 WL 1854112, at *10 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. Aug. 17, 2004) (citing to Lawrence
while holding that a Canadian same-sex marriage could be denied effect in U.S. bankruptcies);
Lofton v. Secretary, 358 F.3d 804, 817 (11 th Cir. 2004) (citing to Lawrence while upholding an
outright ban on "homosexual" individuals' capacity to adopt children under Florida law);
Kansas v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229, 234-35 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (vacated by Lawrence and, upon
remand, citing to Lawrence while holding that Arkansas could impose differential punishment
on minors for prohibited sexual relations on the basis of their sexual orientation). In each
instance, the judges writing these opinions opted to emphasize the constrictive language in
Lawrence, rather than its expansive passages, to distinguish the cases legally and factually. See
infra note 12 (for more on these cases and their application-and circumvention-of
Lawrence). These cases illustrate vividly the ways in which Lawrence can be reduced to
nothing despite its reasoning and outcome, and regardless of eighty years of jurisprudence
preceding it, beginning with the Meyer opinion in 1923. See infra notes 33-40 (on Meyer).
Finally, it bears mention at the outset that articulating the social functionality and legal
worthiness of same-sex couples and families was an early accomplishment of Queer legal
scholarship--an accomplishment also achieved under Bowers' shadow and in spite of what
(ignorant or prejudiced) judges opined to the contrary. See, e.g., Craig A. Bowman & Blake M.
Cornish, Note, A More Perfect Union: A Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership
Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1164 (1992); Barbara J. Cox, Love Makes a Family--Nothing
More, Nothing Less: How the Judicial System Has Refused to Protect Nonlegal Parents in
Alternative Families, 8 J.L. & POL. 5 (1991); Mary C. Dunlap, The Lesbian and Gay Marriage
Debate: A Microcosm of Our Hopes and Troubles in the Nineties, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 63
(1991); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to
Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO.
L.J. 459 (1990); John D. Ingram, A Constitutional Critique of Restrictions on the Right to
Man--Why Can't Fred Marry George-Or Mary and Alice at the Same Time?, 10 J.
CONTEMP. L. 33 (1984). This work continues. See, e.g, Elvia R. Arriola, Law and the Family of
Choice and Need, 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 691 (1997); Nancy D. Polikoff, Ending
Marriage as We Know It, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 201 (2003).
8 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
9 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
1344 [Vol. 65: 1341
ANOMALIES, WARTS AND ALL
Int'l.10 While recognizing the social value of sexual autonomy beyond strictly
traditional terms, this trio of cases-indeed the entire line of privacy cases they
helped to constitute-pointedly have accepted and projected a traditionalist
instrumentalism to explain the Constitution's protection of, first, marital and,
then, individual "acts" and "decisions" relating to "family" and "home." This
emphasis, as discussed below, reflects mainly the factual scenarios presented by
the cases, but they nonetheless have enabled controversy and contestation over
ultimate meanings; their apparent ambivalence perhaps has been exaggerated for
strategic effect in different social, political and legal venues.11 Lawrence, it
seems, now invites the same with its apparently similar ambivalence and
10431 U.S. 678 (1977). See infra notes 67-113 and accompanying text (on this key
liberty-privacy trio). Apart from the joint operation of Griswold, Eisenstadt and Bowers, the
Lawrence Court was acting in light of its recent precedents in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992), and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). Both cases, decided after
Bowers, represented a continuation of the culture wars in judicial contexts. Both cases
represented examples of majorities exercising the power to legislate moralism licensed by
Bowers. If Bowers stood for what it had literally dictated, both of those cases would result in
judicial genuflection to the moralism of the "presumed majority" in Pennsylvania and
Colorado, respectively, as reflected in the legislation enacted and challenged there. But they
didn't; and this detail was portentous. See infra note 13 (on Romer) and infra notes 190-93 and
accompanying text (on Casey).
I I For a critical review of this instrumentalism in privacy jurisprudence, see Francisco
Valdes, Acts of Power, Crimes of Knowledge: Some Observations on Desire, Law and Ideology
in the Politics of Expression at the End of the Twentieth Century, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST.
213 (1997) (critiquing the traditionalist instrumentalism of Griswold and similar privacy cases,
which exalt "marriage and procreation" aspects of liberty-privacy in ways that enable their
exploitation to limit equal liberty-privacy rights for all persons, regardless of marital status or
procreational intent). See generally Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM.
L. REv 1431 (1992) (critiquing privacy as confining rather than emancipatory for similar
reasons); Yvonne L. Tharpes, Comment, Bowers v. Hardwick and The Legitimization of
Homophobia in America, 30 How. L.J. 537 (1987) (discussing the role of law, including case
law, to normalize and license prejudice socially in the wake of the infamous decision in Bowers
embracing sodomy statutes).
The traditionalist aspects of the Lawrence precedents have been minimized in backlash
political rhetoric against "judicial activism" to help mobilize the forces of reaction to New Deal
and Civil Rights law that, in time, have become the culture wars of today; rather than
emphasize how the judges valorized traditional marriage in these cases, backlashers decry their
alleged "judicial activism" to undermine social acceptance of their legitimacy as constitutional
law. Simultaneously, their traditionalist instrumentalism has been highlighted in the
jurisprudence of backlash that serves as the juridical component of these culture wars precisely
to help cabin liberty-privacy strictly around neocolonial traditions. For a more detailed
presentation of this point, see Francisco Valdes, Afierword-"We Have Held": Mapping the
Jurisprudence of Backlash Kulturkampf __ VILL. L. REv. _ (forthcoming 2004)
[hereinafter, Valdes, We Have Held].
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references to instrumentalist rationales for the Constitution's protection of liberty-
privacy. 12
Ultimately, this apparent ambivalence also reflects the demands and
imperatives of the prevailing sociolegal zeitgeist: backlash kulturkampf.13
12 This fallout already is obvious, as illustrated by judges applying Lawrence to current
cases. In Kandu, for instance, a bankruptcy judge quoted Lawrence to deny the validity of a
Canadian same-sex marriage under federal law, noting that the Lawrence justices themselves
had "explicitly stated that the case did not involved whether the government must give formal
recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter." Kandu, 2004 WL
1854112, at * 10. Similarly, in Limon, appellate state judges in Kansas cited and distinguished
Lawrence, both "factually and legally" to uphold disparities in criminal sentencing based on
sexual orientation: that case, said those judges, involved minors and Equal Protection, whereas
Lawrence excluded minors from its holding and was based on liberty-privacy, rather than Equal
Protection. Limon, 83 P.3d at 234. Finally, in Loftion, federal appellate judges upheld Florida's
blanket ban on statutory adoption rights based on sexual orientation noting that the Lawrence
opinion "itself stressed the limited factual situation it was addressing." Loftion, 358 F.3d at 818.
For more on these cases, see supra note 7.
Thus, by strategically centering selective facts and/or doctrines, judges (and others) are
able to skirt the reasoning laid out in Lawrence and its predecessors and circumvent their
meaning, which uniformly have centered on the individual's choice of "destiny" as manifested
or pursued through the "important decisions" protected by the "compendious notion" of liberty-
privacy that professedly vests equally in all individuals regardless of marital status, age or other
axes of identity.
13 The terms "kulturkampf' and "culture wars" may be used to refer to various times and
places, but here they refer only to the current social conflicts within the United States that have
been explicitly denominated as such by the cultural warriors engaged in them. See Francisco
Valdes, Aftierword--Beyond Sexual Orientation in Queer Legal Theory: Majoritarianism,
Multidimensionality and Responsibility in Social Justice Scholarship, Or Legal Scholars as
Cultural Warriors, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1409 (1998) [hereinafter, Valdes, Cultural Warriors].
These "culture wars" of the past quarter century help to explain much of the reactionary turmoil
surrounding the civil rights gains of the past half century. See generally JAMES DAVISON
HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 31-128 (1991); JAMES
DAVISON HUNTER, BEFORE THE SHOOTING BEGINS: SEARCHING FOR DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA'S CULTURE WAR (1994); see also infra note 18 and sources cited therein (discussing
law and related aspects of kulturkampf).
The declaration of cultural warfare issued formally, and perhaps most conspicuously, from
Republican Presidential contender Patrick Buchanan during his address to the 1992 Republican
National Convention. See Chris Black, Buchanan Beckons Conservatives to Come "Home, "
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 18, 1992, at A 12; Paul Galloway, Divided We Stand- Today's "Cultural
War" Goes Deeper than Political Slogans, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 28, 1992, at Cl. Since then, this
social conflict has been waged with a vengeance to "take back" the civil rights gains of the past
century in the name of the "angry white male." See Grant Reeher & Joseph Cammarano, In
Search of the Angry White Male: Gender, Race and Issues in the 1994 Elections, in MIDTERM:
THE ELECTIONS OF 1994 IN CONTEXT 125 (Philip A. Klinkner ed., 1996). In recent years, critical
legal scholars have noted the effects of cultural warfare on law and policy, especially regarding
issues or areas related to antisubordination theory and praxis. See generally Keith Aoki, The
Scholarship of Reconstruction and the Politics of Backlash, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1467 (1996);
Kimberld Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
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Otherwise described as the culture wars, these terms describe a phenomenon
characterized by heightened social conflict over the course of national
development in the United States. 14 In this kulturkampf, "traditional values" are
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Kenneth L. Karst,
Religion, Sex, and Politics: Cultural Counterrevolution in Constitutional Perspective, 24 U.C.
DAVIs L. REV. 677 (1991).
Though law and policy have been notably salient in the conception and implementation of
backlash through kulturkampf, this ambitious redirection of national evolution backward
toward the 1780s has required a multi-pronged campaign. The first prong has focused on
electoral politics: when elections have failed to install amenable politicians or policies into
power, backlashers have resorted to 'direct democracy' to do the job. Effective or formal
control over legislative and executive branches sets the stage for the second prong: stacking the
federal judiciary to clear away inconvenient precedents that empowered minorities or the
federal government's civil rights commitments, as well as to shield regressive executive and
legislative actions that reintroduce subordination from any effective constitutional challenge.
When all else has failed, and as a supplement to these two prongs, backlashers have turned to a
third: control over the spending power, wielded to "starve" social lifelines to vulnerable
communities, including women, racial and ethnic minorities, immigrants, poor persons and
sexual minorities. These three prongs operate interactively though not always neatly, or even
successfully. But operate furiously they do, as events since the 1970s have so sharply shown.
See Valdes, Cultural Warriors, supra, at 1434-43.
This period, as well as the first prong of the culture wars, are perhaps best exemplified by
the facts leading up to Romer v. Evans, a case decided a decade after Bowers that foreshadows,
and is affirmed by, Lawrence. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). In Romer, the Court
considered a constitutional amendment to the state charter adopted by direct statewide
referendum only a few years earlier, which had demarcated "sexual orientation" as an area of
antidiscrimination lawmaking distinct from all other civil rights categories. Id at 623-24.
Amendment Two preempted municipal and local governments from enacting local
antidiscrimination laws that embraced sexual orientation, thus making it impossible to include
sexual minorities in antidiscrimination legislation that covered other traditionally subordinated
social groups on the basis of racial, ethnic, gendered, religious and other kinds of identities. Id
at 624. Under Amendment Two, advocates of civil rights laws based on minority sexual
orientation faced unique political obstacles, prompting both the state and federal supreme courts
to hold that a state majority cannot legislate a categorical exclusion of a minority and its
interests from the mainstream of society based on the majority's "animosity toward the class of
persons affected" or toward its perceived (or actual) way of life. Id at 634-35.
14 In this scheme, a combination of biases and prejudices-fairly described as a "Euro-
heteropatriarchy"--predominates: a combination of supremacist ideologies that formed in
Europe, in particular its northwestern environs, and was inflicted on the world via European
conquest and Eurocentric commerce. See generally Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-
Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation of Sex, Gender & Sexual Orientation to Its Origins, 8 YALE
J.L. & HuMAN. 161 (1996) (describing some basic tenets of Euro-heteropatriarchal social
ideologies). This combination favors the white European male who is both heterosexual and
masculine. It favors European-identified cultures---customs, languages, religions. It combines,
in sum, the racism, nativism, androsexism, heterosexism and cultural chauvinism of those
regions, which in the centuries of colonialism were exported globally and, more recently, are
being reinforced through the social, economic, cultural, legal and political processes of
corporate globalization. See Francisco Valdes, Identity Maneuvers in Law and Society:
2004] 1347
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placed in opposition to claims for social justice posed by groups subordinated
precisely by those traditions and values: during these ongoing culture wars, the
salient groups have been, not coincidentally, women, nonwhites, and sexual
minorities. 15 In this contestation, lawmaking has been a principal means of
Vignettes of a Euro-American Heteropatriarchy, 71 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REV. 377 (2002)
(elaborating on Euro-heteropatriarchy) [hereinafter, Valdes, Identity Maneuvers]. In purpose
and effect, the culture wars aim to reanimate the dominance of colonial-era traditions within the
United States, interrupting anew a slow and troubled historical progression from formal
subordination, to formal equality and antidiscrimination, to, perhaps some day,
antisubordination and social transformation. See Francisco Valdes, Culture, "Kulturkampf' and
Beyond The Antidiscrimination Principle Under the Jurisprudence of Backlash, in THE
BLACKWELL COMPANION To LAW AND SOCIETY 271 (Austin Sarat ed. 2004); see also Jerome
M. Culp, Jr., Angela P. Harris & Francisco Valdes, Subject Unrest, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2435
(2003) (discussing antidiscrimination and antisubordination).
15 While immigrants, women, racial/ethnic minorities, native Americans, the disabled, the
poor, sexual minorities and other traditionally subordinated groups all feel the sting of
retrenchment, they feel it "differently." See Valdes, Cultural Warriors, supra note 13, at 1434-
43 n. 102-36 (discussing the forms that kulturkampf has taken when waged against differently
situated social groups); Nicolas Espiritu, (E)Racing Youth: The Racialized Construction of
California's Proposition 21 and the Development of Alternate Contestations, 52 CLEV.-
MARSHALL L. REV. _ (forthcoming 2004) (focusing on cultural warfare against youth of
color in California through the use of the proposition system in that state). As Bowers itself
demonstrates, backlash jurisprudence began taking hold just as sexual minorities-specifically
lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals--began to claim formal equality and antidiscrimination rights
under existing laws or precedents. In effect, the historical moment for the surge of backlash
kulturkampf and retrenchment occurred at roughly the same time as sexual minorities began
seeking vindication of antidiscrimination rights in federal courts within the broader context of
"civil rights." For sexual minorities in the mid-1980s, not even the liberal legacy of formal
equality had ripened as a source of antidiscrimination leverage in response to the demands of
backlash kulturkampf. Thus, for racial/ethnic minorities, backlash kulturkampf endeavors to roll
back affirmative action programs whereas for sexual minorities the aim is to preclude the
attachment of formal equality altogether. Of necessity, then, the backlash juriprudential
repertoire includes many techniques to retrench civil rights in law and society.
The patterns and techniques of backlash kulturkampf thereby illustrate and recall the
"sameness" and "difference" discourse that has attracted the attention of many legal scholars.
See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND
AMERICAN LAW 19-226 (1990); see also Regina Austin, Black Women, Sisterhood, and the
Difference/Deviance Divide, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 877 (1992); Martha Albertson Fineman,
Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference It Makes, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1992); Joan C.
Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modern Path Beyond
Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 296.
The collective effort to mint concepts like antiessentialism, multiplicity, intersectionality,
cosynthesis, wholism, interconnectivity, multidimesionality and the like also reflects a similar
grappling with issues of sameness and difference in various genres of contemporary critical
legal theory. See, e.g., Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,
Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991); Angela
P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Mari
J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11
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implementing the politics of backlash unleashed by traditionalist reaction to the
tentative but significant social changes that the New Deal and Civil Rights eras
had facilitated during the Twentieth Century.16 Lawrence issues under the
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7 (1989); see also Kimberld Williams Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine,
Feminist Theory andAntiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139.
Various RaceCrit and LatCrit scholars have continued to develop concepts and tools of
critical legal theory to build on these foundational concepts, striving progressively to better
capture the dynamics of "identity politics" in law and society. See, e.g., E. Christi Cunningham,
The Rise of Identity Politics I.- The Myth of the Protected Class in Title VII Disparate Treatment
Cases, 30 CONN. L. REv. 441 (1998) (on wholism); Berta Esperanza Hemandez-Truyol,
Building Bridges-Latinas and Latinos at the Crossroads: Realities, Rhetoric and
Replacement, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 369 (1991) (on multidimensionality); Darren
Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and
Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REv. 561 (1997) (on multidimensionality); Peter Kwan,
Jeffirey Dahmer and the Cosynthesis of Categories, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1257 (1997) (on
cosynthesis); Francisco Valdes, Sex and Race in Queer Legal Culture: Ruminations on
Identities and Inter-Connectivities, 5 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 25 (1995) (on
interconnectivity) [hereinafter, Valdes, Sex and Race]; see also Charles R. Lawrence III,
Foreword-Race, Multiculturalism and the Jurisprudence of Transformation, 47 STAN. L.
REv. 819, 834-35 (1995) (urging greater efforts along these lines to promote multifaceted
projects of social transformation).
Though backlash techniques are obviously and of necessity tailored in part to group
circumstance, see infra note 20, the social pattern of backlash jurisprudence is tightly consistent
if tracked along the fault lines of the culture wars: when state power is used on behalf of
outgroups or to uphold the "liberal" legacy of the Twentieth Century, the use is invalidated or
narrowed, either directly through substantive pronouncements or indirectly through procedural
and similar roadblocks; when state power is used on behalf of ingroups to retrench the "liberal"
legacy, it is accommodated, congratulated, validated. The "losers" are: federal powers over the
enforcement of all civil rights; women's equality and reproductive choice; immigrants' ability
to build a dignified and secure life; gun control legislation to protect schools and
schoolchildren; the environment; black children in elementary and secondary public schools
and their parents; older workers; the criminally accused; the voting strength of African
Americans, Latinas/os, Asian Americans and other racial/ethnic minorities; sexual minorities
and our ability to cultivate without persecution our intimate relationships, families, careers and
other basic elements of life; and the disabled and their opportunity to function socially with
dignity. Thus, the pattern of winners and losers--the impact of these cases on ingroups and
outgroups--provides the chief line of consistency in the jurisprudential melange of the culture
war cases since the mid-1970s. As a set and individually, the contorted opinions in culture war
cases have thrown new roadblocks in the way of this nation's unfinished and acrimonious
progression toward social equality under the Rule of Law. For a more extended discussion of
"culture war cases" and backlashing techniques, see Valdes, We Have Held, supra note 11. See
also infra notes 16-18 (elaborating the culture wars).
16 A key strategic objective of backlash kulturkampf has been taking control of the federal
judiciary to accomplish a dual aim: to re-deploy judicial review toward "rolling back" (rather
than guiding the further development of) the New Deal and Civil Rights laws as much as
possible, and to shield executive and legislative acts of retrenchment from challenge through
judicial channels. The demand for "strict construction" specifically of federal powers and
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shadows of this conflict; it cannot help but be embedded in its sociolegal
context.17 Yet Lawrence also stands out as an exception to the prevailing patterns
of the culture war cases that have helped implement the kulturkampf agenda in
the United States during the closing decades of the Twentieth Century.
This raging phenomenon, and the politics of backlash that fuel it, are
exemplified perhaps most aptly by the notorious precedent that Lawrence
emphatically sets to rest: Bowers v. Hardwick.18 Coming after Griswold,
individual rights was designed to clip the powers of government that had disrupted entrenched
local hierarchies based on race and other sources of faction-local hierarchies that had captured
and monopolized state and local govenments during eras of de jure subordination. In this
reversal of policymaking trajectories, the specific yet monumental task is undoing, as much as
politically possible, the legal and social legacies both of the New Deal and Civil Rights eras.
This undoing, in turn, sets the stage for a restoration of traditionalist hierarchies both legally and
socially. Bowers, therefore, is the backlash ruling towering over the privacy and substantive
Due Process rollback. In addition, however, the backlash cases can be seen in three other broad
frames of doctrine: Equality and Antidiscrimination; Voting Rights and Democracy; and
Federalism and Federal Legislative Power. Each is punctuated by highlights that help to employ
the patterns and dynamics of this kulturkampf in jurisprudential terms. They span the decades
of the culture wars, and are made possible by the court-packing prong of those wars. See
Valdes, We Have Held, supra note 11.
17 Backlash jurisprudence consequently comprises the juridical portion of this larger
societal reaction to the mixed social and political gains secured to "outsiders" by the formal
legal advances of the Civil Rights era. Notably, however, at no time does backlash
jurisprudence formally confess its disdain for the national commitment to the antidiscrimination
principle, nor openly admit its ideological commitment to reversing the historical trajectory
toward antisubordination. Valdes, Jurisprudence of Backlash, supra note 14, at 280. On the
contrary, formal equality is formally upheld even as "states rights" that oftentimes serve to
undermine it are expansively-aggressively--construed under the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments, and while individual rights and federal powers to protect them are construed
"strictly" across the board. The former thus expand while the latter retrench.
18 478 U.S. 186 (1986). As one of the early culture war cases, the Bowers quintet's
opinion quickly became a foundational building block for the backlash proposition that
"privacy" was an illegitimately conceived brainchild of liberal activist judges, and that
"fundamental rights" more generally are dangerous to democracy. Under that view, judicial
protection of "privacy" rights and liberties threaten society and the Rule of Law precisely
because "the Court is most vulnerable and comes closest to illegitimacy when it deals with
judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of
the Constitution." Id. at 194. To guard against that illegitimacy, the Bowers quintet had written,
the Court had imposed on itself two disciplinary devices designed to "assure itself and the
public that announcing rights not readily identifiable in the Constitution's text involves much
more than the imposition of the Justices' own choice of values on the States and the Federal
Government." Id. at 191. The first limits judges to "fundamental liberties that are implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" and the second limits judges to "liberties that are deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition." Id at 191-92. Both of these ostensibly limiting
formulations are obviously vulnerable to all kinds of manipulation, as are many rules of law:
both of these shift the discretion of the judges to competing (and perhaps conflicting)
descriptions of more-or-less analogous "histories and traditions" and personalized notions of
"ordered liberty" but, as Bowers vividly proved, neither removes nor eliminates the ultimate
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Eisenstadt, Carey and related privacy rulings, Bowers emphasized the
traditionalist aspects of those cases to cast tight little jurisprudential nets around
the "dots" represented by the particular decisions or choices of the preceding
cases and to deny the existence of a coherent "field" or "zone" of constitutional
protection. 19 Those tight little nets were constructed of varied jurisprudential
techniques cumulatively designed to atomize the precedents and to suffocate, in
time, privacy rights altogether. 20 For seventeen years those and other backlashing
decisional discretion of willful judges bent on strategically emphasizing, or even inventing,
"history and tradition" along the way to saying Yes or No in the name of the Constitution. After
Bowers, the invocation of "morality and democracy" or of "history and tradition" increasingly
became a tolling bell for the death of civil rights; the Fourteenth Amendment progressively
became a dead letter as more and more potential litigants "got the message" and headed to state
courts in search of respectful treatment, fair hearing and potential vindication of civil rights
grievances. See Valdes, Cultural Warriors, supra note 13, at 1426-34 (discussing state
alternatives to federal remedies in the pursuit of sexual minority civil rights during this time);
see also Valdes, We Have Held, supra note 11.
19 See infra notes 50-59 and 111-13 and accompanying text (on the "zones" versus the
"dots" conceptions of liberty-privacy).
20 Those techniques, as Bowers illustrates, included severely myopic assertions of "history
and tradition" calculated to produce rejection of constitutional protection for individual rights
and liberties in a technologically and demographically evolving society, coupled with
formalistic intonations of formal democracy to license political practices like the legislation of
"presumed morality"-a license to exercise nominally democratic power that the framers of the
Constitution well might have described as the "tyranny of the majority." In addition, backlash
activism has included the aggressive review of precedent to narrow their civil rights reach; the
heightening of procedural rules to block civil rights claims on technical grounds; the strict
interpretation of legislative initiatives on behalf of civil rights communities under both principal
instruments for doing so-the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment;
and, finally, a proactive and unilateral reinterpretation of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments
to expand "states' rights" affirmatively under "fundamental postulates" based on the personal
views and preferences mainly of five justices. For further discussion of backlash techniques, see
Valdes, We Have Held, supra note 11; see also, Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination
Agenda, I1l YALE L.J. 1141 (2002) (evaluating the current judges' manipulation or disregard
of precedent and canons of interpretation).
Of course, during the past two decades or so various scholars have documented how
judges manipulate their discretion to achieve their preferred ideological outcomes, including
their abuse of these and similar techniques. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont et al., How
Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMPLOYEE
RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 547 (2003); Kevin M. Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia
in the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ From Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U.
ILL. L. REV. 947, 970; William B. Gould, IV, The Supreme Court and Employment
Discrimination Law in 1989: Judicial Retreat and Congressional Response, 64 TUL. L. REV.
1485, 1485-87 (1990) (focusing on retrenchment in that key term of the Supreme Court);
Charles R. Lawrence, III, "Justice" or "Just Us ": Racism and the Role of Ideology, 35 STAN.
L. REV. 831, 837-39 (1983) (focusing on race and White Supremacy); Nancy Levit, The
Caseload Conundrum, Constitutional Restraint and the Manipulation of Jurisdiction, 64
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321, 321 (1989) (critiquing the interposition of jurisdictional and
prudential barriers to deflect civil rights actions); Robert P. Smith, Jr., Explaining Judicial
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techniques succeeded in cutting off almost all jurisprudential oxygen to the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and in particular to "privacy" as
the most salient dimension of "modem" substantive Due Process. And then, in the
midst of this raging conflict, Lawrence came around.
In affirming Griswold, Eisenstandt and Carey, Lawrence no doubt remains
significantly moored in traditionalist instrumentalism. But in stressing their
emancipatory values, and articulating them in a realist or functionalist manner,
Lawrence effectively re-centers both critical analysis and antisubordination values
in Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence: Lawrence critically perceives the
functional role of sodomy statutes and the interplay of formal criminality and
social subordination they perpetrate; Lawrence critically perceives the interaction
of various categories at multiple levels, ranging from "private" and "public" to
formal and social. Indeed, Lawrence serves to remove from the arsenal of
backlash politicians and judges the main weapon they had wielded for seventeen
years with increasing arrogance and formal effectiveness: Bowers as mighty
precedent.2 '
Recognizing Lawrence's ambivalence and its shortcomings, this Article
sketches some basic points on the line of cases establishing "the right of privacy
embraced in the 'liberty' of the Due Process Clause" 22 to extract as much
emancipatory punch as possible toward the realization of this ruling's potential.
Beginning with doctrine, Part II charts the evolution of liberty-privacy during the
eighty years of liberty, privacy and equality bracketed by the rulings in Meyer v.
Nebraska23 and Lawrence v. Texas to contextualize the creation of the "Equal
Protection anomaly" that Bowers crowned and Lawrence brings to an end. Part III
then briefly considers the institutional and other circumstances that may help to
explain this ruling and its apparent dualities, proffering some speculation on the
reasons for Lawrence and its timing, before closing with a short notation on the
right to sexual self-determination already embedded in Griswold and progeny
Lawgivers, 11 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 153 (1983) (surveying techniques of judicial manipulation
of facts and doctrine); Keith C. Wingate, A Special Pleading Rule for Civil Rights Complaints:
A Step Forward or a Step Back?, 49 Mo. L. REv. 677 (1984) (critiquing the heightened rules of
pleading that various federal judges had erected to rebuff civil rights claimants); see also supra
note 17 and sources cited therein on backlash and retrenchment.
21 In addition, Lawrence helps to diminish the role of (1) "history and tradition" as a
virtually insurmountable jurisprudential block to legal recognition of insights or lessons to be
drawn from social experience-or history--subsequent to the 1780s and (2) "presumed
morality" as a self-justifying phenomenon somehow automatically transmuted into presumed
democratic lawmaking, to which judges of course must bow. The loss of these two weapons
makes the task of backlashers more complicated, for they now must do more than simply wave
the wands that these two weapons had become since Bowers. See supra note 20. Moreover,
Lawrence validates antisubordination analysis and critical realism in liberty-privacy analysis.
For a more extensive elaboration of these points, see Valdes, We Have Held, supra note 11.
22 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
23 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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despite their apparent ambivalence-a right sidelined by backlashers but which
Lawrence now poises for overdue explicit recognition. This Article thus accepts
that, especially in this era of unabated kulturkampf, Lawrence can indeed be bent
to mean nothing even when it might be fashioned to mean all. This Article
proceeds from the wary recognition that Lawrence's apparent ambivalence can be
manipulated to various ideological ends, as recent and current experience with
other liberty-privacy precedents so vividly demonstrates. 24
24 By way of background and context, this Article is the second of four elucidating
backlash jurisprudence as part and parcel of the culture wars, a quartet of writings which in turn
build on previous efforts. The first part of this quartet is Valdes, Jurisprudence of Backlash,
supra note 11, which focuses broadly on three theoretical perspectives---backlash
jurisprudence, liberal legalisms and critical outsider jurisprudence--to compare their
approaches to equality law and policy. The second part, as just noted, is this Article, which
focuses specifically on Lawrence and generally on liberty-privacy to sketch some basic patterns
and points in this central doctrinal terrain of social and legal retrenchment. The third part of this
series is Francisco Valdes, Afterword-"We Have Held": Mapping the Jurisprudence of
Backlash Kulturkampf _ VILLA. L. REv. - (2005), which will address other doctrinal
terrains of the culture wars and their associated techniques or patterns. The fourth and
concluding part is Francisco Valdes, Culture by Law: Jurisprudence as Kulturkampf-A
Postcardfrom Amerika, __ FL. J. INT'L L. __ (2005), which will explore two primary themes
of backlash kulturkampf, both within and beyond the United States: Democracy and Tradition.
This quartet, as mentioned above, in turn builds on prior and ongoing efforts to comprehend
and chart the inter-connections, if any, of the legal devolutions that have swept across this
country during the past two decades or so against immigrants, communities of color, sexual
minorities, women and poor persons in order to craft structures and practices of resistance to
this wholesale retrenchment. See Francisco Valdes, Outsider Jurisprudence, Critical Pedagogy
and Social Justice Activism: Marking the Stirrings of Critical Legal Education, 10 ASIAN L.J.
65 (2003); Valdes, Identity Maneuvers, supra note 14; Francisco Valdes, Insisting on Critical
Theory in Legal Education: Making Do While Making Waves, 12 LA RAZA L.J. 137 (2001);
Francisco Valdes, Race, Ethnicity and Hispanismo in Triangular Perspective: The "Essential
Latina/o" and LatCrit Theory, 48 UCLA L. REv. 305 (2000); Francisco Valdes, Outsider
Scholars, Legal Theory and OutCrit Perspectivity: Postsubordination Vision as Jurisprudential
Method, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 831 (2000); Francisco Valdes, Afterword-Theorizing "OutCrit"
Theories: Coalitional Method and Comparative Jurisprudential Experience-RaceCrits,
QueerCrits, LatCrits, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1265 (1999); Francisco Valdes, Afterword-Beyond
Sexual Orientation in Queer Legal Theory: Majoritarianism, Multidimensionality and
Responsibility in Social Justice Scholarship-Or, Legal Scholars as Cultural Warriors, 75
DENv. U. L. REv. 1409 (1998); Francisco Valdes, Queer Margins, Queer Ethics: A Call to
Account for Race and Ethnicity in the Law, Theory and Politics of "Sexual Orientation", 48
HASTINGS L.J. 1193 (1997); Valdes, Sex and Race, supra note 15. In time, this work should
produce a book, FRANCISCO VALDES, OF JUDGES AND THEIR PLEASURES: LAW AND SOCIAL
ENGINEERING AT THE TURN OF A MILLENNIUM.
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II. PRIVACY AS LIBERTY: JUDGING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Much has been made of the "equality" versus "privacy" angles of Lawrence,
and the Court's emphasis on "liberty" as the chief textual basis of its holding.25
Indeed, this ado begins in the outcome of the case itself, wherein Justice
O'Connor's concurrence would direct our gaze toward a mirage based on Equal
Protection. In that opinion, O'Connor posits that the Texas statute's focus on
same-sex intimacy triggers an Equal Protection problem because the statute, on its
face, leaves mixed-sex intimacy untouched; this legislative differential treatment
of sodomy, asserts O'Connor, violates the constitutional guarantees of the Equal
Protection Clause because it permits the actual, or as Bowers put it, the
"presumed" majority of a state to single out a particular class or classification
within its population for a proscription or regulation that it does not apply to
itself.26 This analysis surely is on the mark, but noting this formal inequality at
this late jurisprudential stage overlooks the equality anomaly that O'Connor
herself, along with her four Brethren speaking for the Court in 1986, created and
bequeathed to us.27 That anomaly, as Justice Stevens pointed out in his Bowers
dissent at the moment of its birthing, was created by the juxtaposition of Bowers
with the line of precedents that had "made abundantly clear" (and expressly had
not delimited) constitutional "privacy" rights up to that point.28
A. Before and After Bowers: The Privacy Cases and the Equality Anomaly
Privacy jurisprudence of course extends back to the 1920s with Meyer v.
Nebraska29 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters30 but Griswold v. Connecticut31 in
1965 is usually taken as the beginning of "modem" privacy cases. Since then, this
articulation usually has provided the point of departure for privacy analysis, as the
Lawrence case itself shows by anchoring itself in Griswold and its three principal
progeny: Eisenstadt in 1972, Roe v. Wade32 in 1973, and Carey in 1977.
Focusing in those dozen years increasingly though not exclusively on the text of
the Fourteenth Amendment, these post-Griswold cases etched the frames of
"privacy" around the Due Process protection of "liberty" and, later, around the
25 See supra note 7 and sources cited therein (commenting on Lawrence).
26 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring). For Bowers' language, see
infra notes 139-46 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 166-71 and accompanying text (providing a further elaboration of this
equality anomaly).
28 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see infra Part II.A.3.b (describing Stevens'
Bowers dissent).
29 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
30 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
31 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
32 410 U.S. 113 (1978).
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corollary provision of "Equal Protection." When Bowers arrived at the high
Court's steps in the mid-1980s, this evolving jurisprudence became scrambled
almost beyond recognition in the juridical pursuit of the backlash agenda
established by the culture wars.
1. Before Griswold: Establishing the Parameters of Liberty-Privacy
The cases leading up to Griswold establish or suggest a number of doctrinal
points that backlash jurisprudence has occluded for the past seventeen years,
beginning with Bowers. Most pertinent to this Article are the following three: (1)
that "liberty" as used in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
the textual source of individual privacy rights; (2) that liberty-privacy protects
individual choices regarding education and other "personal" decisions which have
one thing in common-whether the state or the individual will control the social
destiny that those choices cumulatively would help to chart and accomplish for
that individual; and (3) that the facts of those cases-and therefore the holdings
and rationales-were illustrative and perhaps paradigmatic, but expressly not
exhaustive, of the individual choices protected constitutionally by liberty-privacy.
As a set, these precedents sometimes specified and sometimes illustrated the
"compendious notion" of liberty-privacy established over the course of the
nation's history in the form of Due Process jurisprudence. In rejecting Bowers,
Lawrence returns to these original roots and arrested trajectories.
Meyer v. Nebraska. In Meyer, a 1923 case, the Supreme Court
considered the challenge of a German language teacher to a Nebraska statute
imposing English-only education through the seventh grade.33 In a 7-2 ruling,
explicitly relying on the liberty text of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Meyer
justices began by expressly noting that "this court has not attempted to define
with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed. '34 Then, citing to varied precedent
spanning most of the Court's history, the justices itemized key exemplars
from past adjudications: liberty-privacy protects, in addition, to
freedom from bodily restraint .. .the right of the individual (emphasis
added) to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to
acquire useful knowledge, to many, to establish a home and bring up children, to
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.35
31 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396-97.
34 Id at 399.
35 Id. at 399 (emphasis added).
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They then concluded that the teacher's "right thus to teach and the right of
parents to engage him so to instruct their children.. are within the liberty of
the Amendment." 36
In this foundational case, the justices unequivocally identified the
"individual" as the bearer of liberty-privacy rights-in this instance, school
teachers and parents or guardians of children.37 And though their litany of
precedential examples did not include a previously-stated "right to educational
choice"--either for parents or for teachers-the Meyer justices had no difficulty
discerning similarities that connected those cases with this one-similarities that
they articulated two years later in their unanimous Pierce opinion. Meyer,
moreover, shows that, from the beginning of liberty-privacy jurisprudence, the
justices viewed and approached individuals' Due Process rights not as ad hoc
fragments of law but as a flexible field of constitutional protection covered by the
organizing principle of "liberty."
As in the cases before and since (with the notable exception of Bowers), the
justices in Meyer focused on the claims and facts actually before them, and found
liberty-privacy rights in scenarios where "marriage" or marital status were not at
issue. Indeed, both Meyer and the precedents it itemized include a number of
protected choices that extend beyond sexual expression or intimacy, or where
neither sexuality nor procreation was factually at issue. Most significantly,
perhaps, the justices in this foundational precedent began by expressly
disclaiming any notion that the claims, facts and holdings of these cases-or their
descriptions of them--constituted a juridical "attempt" to "define" or delimit the
entirety of liberty-privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 38 With the exception of Bowers and its progeny,39 this flexible,
36 Id at 400.
371d.
38 Id.
39 The principal example of backlash jurisprudence specifically under Bowers and privacy
is Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), an exemplar of backlashers' efforts to use
constitutional interpretation and majoritarian politics to freeze society in the mold of 1787. In
brief, the justices in Glucksberg sought to demonstrate that the backlash approach to the
Fourteenth Amendment generally, and to "history and tradition" specifically, that had been
centered in Bowers represented authoritatively the state of the law, rather than being an
anomalous and willful departure from evolving, yet firm, Fourteenth Amendment precedents
from Griswold to Carey. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723-28. In Glucksberg, a Washington statute
criminalized the provision of information or assistance to terminally ill competent adults
choosing to expedite, rather than retard, their eventual deaths. Id. at 706-07. Physicians and
terminally ill competent adults in the state challenged the statute based on the Fourteenth
Amendment's protection of liberty, claiming a "right to control" their final encounter with life
and to "choose a humane, dignified death" over more painful or prolonged options coerced
formally or constructively by medical regimes or family preferences. Id at 708. The district
court struck down the statute, and was affirmed on appeal en banc. Id. at 708-09. When the
case reached the Supreme Court, the same bloc of five justices who have banded together since
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open-ended approach to liberty-privacy would become characteristic of Due
Process jurisprudence in the eighty years between Meyer and Lawrence.40
1993 to implement backlash jurisprudence from that bench joined in yet another a 5-4 opinion
that scrambled familiar jurisprudential lines to delimit individual rights and liberties. Issued by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Glucksberg opinion overturned the lower courts' rulings with a
text-book rendition of backlash jurisprudence. See id. at 735-36. Glucksberg is instructive in
understanding Lawrence specifically, and backlash jurisprudence generally, both because it was
Bowers' cousin in the area of liberty-privacy and because it epitomizes the ways and means of
jurisprudential kulturkampf. For more on Glucksberg in the context of social and legal
kulturkampf, see Valdes, We Have Held, supra note 11.
40 This approach of course has enabled cries of "judicial activism" at each disposition of a
case. Legitimate concerns over willful abuses of judicial discretion of course go back to the
Constitution's framing, and have been perennial ever since. "The courts must declare the sense
of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the
consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body."
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 381 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terrence Bull ed., 2003). For incisive
accounts of "original" concerns and exchanges regarding federal judicial power and its potential
abuse by individuals appointed to be judges, see JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:
POLITICS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996); LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT
AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION (1988). See also GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969). This legitimate historical concern erupted into the
open most fully and dramatically in the first half of the Twentieth Century when politically
conservative judges directed the powers of the judiciary to invalidate majoritarian lawmaking of
the New Deal agenda on behalf of workers, consumers and other relatively under-privileged
social groups. For notable accounts, see WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, 1932-1940 (1963); William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of
Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court Packing" Plan, 1966 SuP. CT. REv. 347. That opposition,
anchored in the asserted liberty right of contract, repeatedly favored the interests of big business
and employers, but required increasingly obvious judicial gyrations to maintain. See, e.g.,
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53, 64-65 (1905) (striking down a state fair employment
statute limiting the working day to no more than ten hours and the work week to no more than
sixty hours on the grounds that this regulation "interferes with the right of contract between
employer and employees" alike). By 1937, that prime historical example of the legitimate
concern over judicial activism had become untenable, and came to an embarrassing end that
continues to haunt and embarrass the institution, as its invocation in liberty-privacy cases
ranging from Griswold to Bowers and Casey pointedly show. See infra notes 66-165 and 181-
200 and accompanying text (discussing these cases and their concerns over judicial activism).
Today, as Griswold and progeny also show, the same basic notion-"liberty" protected by
Due Process-is at the heart of privacy jurisprudence, and of the backlashing efforts to arrest it.
This similarity-the focus on "liberty"--lends itself to superficial comparisons designed to
promote backlash kulturkampf. In particular, as Bowers specifically illustrates, this similarity
permits strategic but inapposite assertions that today's recognition of liberty-privacy is as much
of an illegitimate judicial concoction as the "judicial activism" that blocked reform legislation
two generations ago under the asserted liberty to enter into private commercial contracts. Even
though some of the same judges articulated both the economic and the personal aspects of
liberty during the 1 920s, one key distinction between the jurisprudence delineating each is that
personal liberty-the line of cases sketched here elaborating liberty-privacy from 1923
onward--now is the cumulative work-product of multiple judges across ideologies and
generations, which cognizably "built" substantively on precedent, rather than the concentrated
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Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary. Two
years later the justices next considered a factually and legally similar scenario: the
challenge of private school operators to an Oregon law, this time enacted by
popular referendum, which made public education compulsory up to the age of
sixteen. 4 1 The unanimous Pierce justices relied explicitly on "the doctrine" of
Meyer and, as in that case, concluded that the state action here "unreasonably
interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
handiwork of a small cadre of judges single-handedly engineering an abrupt break from
established jurisprudential patterns to promote a larger coordinated campaign aiming to redirect
the long-term evolution of law and society. Judicial imposition of economic liberty, as the
judges themselves have acknowledged, exemplified Hamilton's concern over "judgment" and
"will"-the latter, will, being a judge's abuse of a court's power to effectuate the judge's
preferred policy position. See Valdes, We Have Held, supra note 11.
For their part, since that embarrassing collision, the judges of the Supreme Court
repeatedly have distinguished between "economic" liberty and "personal" liberty under
substantive Due Process on the grounds that majoritarian efforts to regulate the former are no
more than state management of the market while majoritarian efforts to regulate the latter
amount to a state take-over of individual "destiny." See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying
text (discussing individual "destiny" as the liberty interest protected by privacy). This
distinction substantively amounts to acknowledgement that the state has wide leeway in the
regulation of individual participation in the "public" spheres of economic markets but narrow
leeway in the regulation of intimate choices in the "private" spheres of education, relationships
and lifestyle through which individuals typically endeavor to direct their social destiny in the
course of living their everyday lives. See, e.g., Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S.
421, 425 (1952) (upholding state regulation of working hours, noting that "if our recent cases
mean anything, they leave debatable issues as respects business, economic, and social affairs to
legislative decision"); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S.
525, 536 (1949) (upholding state regulation of employment contracts while emphasizing that
economic liberty is generally subject to intensive state regulation because such regulations "do
not run afoul of some specific federal constitutional prohibition" and, in addition, it should be
noted, because constitutional text and design grant the federal government extensive powers
over commercial activities).
Of course, feminist and other scholars have amply demonstrated that the distinction
between "public" and "private" spheres of law and society oftentimes is a tool to justify the
subordination of women as a social group. See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections
on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281 (1991) (critiquing the gendered notions
embedded in legal rules and doctrines); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42
STAN. L. REv. 617 (1990) (surveying Feminist legal scholarship and the salient points of, or
interconnections among, varied currents of feminism in legal theorizing); GERDA LERNER, THE
CREATION OF PATRIARCHY (1986) (providing a comprehensive historical account of gender
roles and corresponding hierarchies). In this instance, this legitimate antisubordination concern
over the application of this manipulable distinction seems absent because, in this context, as the
cases from Meyer to Lawrence (with the exception of Bowers) show, the distinction shields
otherwise extremely vulnerable social groups from majoritarian suppression though the force of
law. See supra notes 33-40 and infra notes 41-165 (on the cases from Meyer to Bowers and
their anti-majoritarian protection of unpopular or nonconformist individual choices in matters of
education, relationships and lifestyle).
41 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530-31.
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education of children under their control"-even though adopted by "popular"
initiative. 42 Having thereby described the specific aspect of "liberty" that both
Meyer and this case protected-educational choice and its social significance to
individuals and those responsible for them- the justices then specified the
commonalities that these two cases shared with the earlier cases they had itemized
in Meyer: "The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this
Union repose excludes any general power... to standardize" individual persons
by controlling decisions that incrementally constitute an effort to exert choice
over the course or direction of one's life or personality. 43
Applying this overarching rationale, the Pierce justices focused on the claims
and facts before them to specify a core similarity they discerned between this
aspect of liberty and those in the varied precedents they had itemized in Meyer:
the "child is not the mere creature of the State... [and cannot] direct his
destiny."44 The Meyer-Pierce cases thereby centered the key similarity or
organizing principle that cohered the precedents on the liberty-privacy rights of
individuals under the Fourteenth Amendment: absent a compelling public
interest, the state may not "direct [individual] destiny" through a usurpation of the
life choices that persons make to realize their individuation; Due Process prohibits
state efforts to commandeer the ongoing human development of individuals
through formal majoritarian decisions that proscribe or trump individuated
choices over a range of elections that, cumulatively, amount to a person's social
"destiny."45 Moreover, the facts and outcome of Pierce, like those of Meyer,
concretely illustrated from the very inception of this line of precedents that
liberty-privacy inheres in individuals rather than "married couples" and
constitutes a flexible field of robustly anti-majoritarian protection for personal
choices that plainly extend beyond marital intimacies for procreational purposes.
Poe v. Ullman. Nearly four decades later, in 1961, the justices returned to
Meyer-Pierce and related cases46 to consider the challenge of married women to
42 id. at 534-35.
4 3 Id. at 535.
4 4 Id. (emphasis added).
45 Id.
46 The principal related case is Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), in which the
Supreme Court struck down a state criminal statute imposing sterilization as punishment on
Equal Protection grounds because of sentencing disparities between similar offenses. Skinner,
316 U.S. at 543. In arriving at this holding, however, the justices, in an opinion by Douglas,
noted that "[w]e are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of
man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.
The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects." Id
at 541. Because the individual interest was so great--"fundamental"---the disparity in
sentencing schemes under state law was constitutionally intolerable, the justices there
concluded: "When the law lays an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the
same quality of offense and sterilizes one and not the other, it has made as invidious a
discrimination as if it had selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment." Id.
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Connecticut's anti-contraception statute-the same one challenged again in
Griswold-which criminalized, without exception, the "use" of contraceptives
within the state. 47 The Poe justices dismissed the case for lack of standing: citing
a "lack of immediacy" to any prosecution of the plaintiffs for violation of the
statute, the justices concluded that no justiciable constitutional question was
properly presented. 48 The Poe justices thereby postponed a ruling on the merits,
and on the meaning of liberty-privacy under those facts. The importance of this
case consequently lies in the two dissents, filed by Douglas and Harlan, which,
together with Meyer and Pierce, provided much of the basis for a disposition on
the merits four years later when the same law and very similar facts were
presented to the justices in the Griswold case.
The first Poe dissent, filed by Douglas, both embraces the precedents up to
that point as well as presages Griswold. The Douglas dissent grounds privacy
squarely in the liberty text of the Fourteenth Amendment-as Meyer and Pierce
had-while also pointing out that "'[l]iberty' is a conception that sometimes gains
content from the emanations of other specific guarantees" in the Constitution.49
The second, Harlan's highly-cited dissent, explains why the statute impinged on
individual rights even if no immediate enforcement action had been threatened
against a particular individual before setting out "to state the framework of
Constitutional principles in which [liberty-privacy claims] must be judged."50
Both dissenters relied on Meyer-Pierce and related cases while focusing on the
claims and facts actually before them, and hence framed their discussion around
married persons and their contraceptive choices rather than around children,
teachers or parents and their educational choices. But the Harlan dissent became
the most substantively significant because its framework has been cited and
applied by some of the justices in Griswold, and since. His proposed
"framework" underscored three sets of points that, in Harlan's words, consciously
endeavored to "build" 51 on the liberty-privacy jurisprudence of the Fourteenth
Because this Equal Protection ruling referred to the individual interests involved in
"fundamental" terms, Skinner oftentimes is regarded as part of liberty-privacy jurisprudence.
47 Poe, 367 U.S. at 498.
4 8 Id. at 501-09. This very same factual and doctrinal scenario resurfaced in Doe v.
Commonwealth, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), a case with extremely weak grounds to
find standing that the District Court nonetheless decided and rejected on the merits but which
the Supreme Court in 1976 summarily affirmed without explanation as to the basis for its
affirmance. See Doe v. Commonwealth, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). This ambiguity became central to
liberty-privacy jurisprudence, making the factual and doctrinal similarities between Poe and
Doe illuminating. See infra notes 100-04 and accompanying text (on Doe and this ambiguity).
49 Poe, 367 U.S. at 517 (Douglas, J., dissenting). For Douglas, this latter point became
predominant four years later, in his opinion for the Court in Griswold. See infra note 73 and
accompanying text (discussing Douglas' shift in emphasis).
50 Id at 539 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 546.
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Amendment delineated in Meyer-Pierce and, even earlier, by their itemized
precedents.
The first point is methodological, in which Harlan cites the early
constitutional law landmark of McCulloch v. Maryland52 and relies on the "sound
construction" approach developed by Chief Justice Marshall in that and similar
cases to dispel early strategic calls for "strict construction" of the Constitution.53
Making this first point, Harlan writes that the liberty text of the Due Process
Clause must be interpreted in a "rational" or flexible rather than a strict or
formalist manner:
precisely because it is the Constitution alone which warrants judicial interference
in sovereign operations of the State, the basis of judgment as to the
Constitutionality of state action must be a rational one, approaching the text
which is the only commission for our power not in a literalistic way, as if we had
a tax statute before us, but as the basic charter of our society, setting out in spare
but meaningful terms the principles of government. 54
The second point of this influential dissent is doctrinal, in which Harlan notes that
"[a]gain and again this Court has resisted the notion that the Fourteenth
Amendment is no more than a shorthand reference to what is explicitly set out
elsewhere in the Bill of Rights." 55 In making this second point, Harlan specifies
that the Due Process Clause, approached in a "sound" and "rational" manner,
must be recognized as "an independent guaranty of liberty and procedural
fairness, more general and inclusive than the specific prohibitions" found
52 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
53 Poe, 367 U.S. at 540 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
316, 421 (1819)). In McCulloch, the Supreme Court upheld federal legislation chartering a
federal bank even though the text of the Constitution does not expressly enumerate the power to
charter corporations among those vested in the federal legislature. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 317-
18. In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Marshall, the Court juxtaposed two basic
approaches to constitutional interpretation: the "just" or "sound" approach versus the "narrow"
or "strict" approach. Id at 401-37. Opting for the former, those judges reasoned that the latter
would entail a "baneful influence" on the nation due to the "absolute impracticality of
maintaining it without rendering the government incompetent to its great objects." Id. at 417-
18. This rendering is precisely the goal of cultural warfare and backlash activism, thus disabling
the government from reforming locally and historically entrenched social hierarchies that were
established in part by force of law in previous eras of formal subordination based on race,
ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation and other forms of social stratification, and that now are
structurally pervasive culturally and materially in law and society; historically dominant groups
waging backlash kulturkampf calculate that their privilege and dominance vis a vis historically
subordinated groups is best preserved, and perhaps amplified, by disabling the possibility of
state power to reform historic injustices that have enriched and empowered them. For a more
substantive articulation of this point, see Valdes, We Have Held, supra note 11.
54 Poe, 367 U.S. at 539-40 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
55 Id. at 541.
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elsewhere in the Constitution. 56 The third and final point of this "framework" is
conceptual, in which Harlan emphasizes that a sound and rational interpretation of
liberty must recognize both the "traditions from which it developed as well as the
traditions from which it broke"57 in order to appreciate that "this liberty is not a
series of isolated points pricked out [of the Constitution or the judges' whims] ...
• [but rather] a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom
from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints" enacted by
the State through majoritarian lawmaking. 58 Quoting from Pierce and Meyer,
Harlan then applies this framework to the Poe facts and "to the particular
Constitutional claim in [that] case" to consider whether they fit within "the
compendious notion of 'liberty' embraced in the Fourteenth Amendment .59
Substantively, much has been made of Harlan's distinction between
"marriage" and "homosexuality" in the course of applying his framework in the
second part of his Poe dissent.60 And indeed he did. But Harlan refers to some
version of same-sex relations three times in his dissent, and each time
commingled with topics that, to Harlan, apparently were analogous, including
fornication, abortion, sterilization and suicide.61 Moreover, in each instance
Harlan refers to same-sex sexuality as an illustration of a broader institutional or
jurisprudential point: each of Harlan's three broader points were designed to help
situate his proposed-and dissenting-framework in that case as the principled
sum of the precedents up to that point. These broader points, as a set, were
designed to address institutional concerns of "judicial activism" likely to be raised
by his emphasis on flexible, functional and open-ended Due Process adjudication
under the governing principles of the framework he had elaborated in the first part
of his dissent.
In the first instance, Harlan refers to "adult consensual homosexuality" as one
example among various, including non-sexual examples, to illustrate the general
56 Id. at 542.
57 1d.
58 Id. at 543 (emphasis added).
59 Poe, 367 U.S. at 544-46 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan concludes the statute is
unconstitutional, not because it seeks to impose procreation as policy but because the State
cannot choose "obnoxiously intrusive means... to effectuate that policy." Id at 554. Like other
parts of this generally influential dissent, Harlan's conclusion on this point was flawed; it
overlooked Meyer's key precaution in explaining the constitutional values protected by liberty-
privacy: that individuals are not "mere creatures" of the State, whose existence and destiny may
be commandeered in the name of the majority to serve its preferred policy dictates. See supra
notes 33-40 and accompanying text (discussing Meyer). Not surprisingly, then, Harlan's
premature conclusion in this part of his Poe dissent has been overtaken by liberty-privacy
holdings like those in Eisenstadt, Roe and Carey. See infra notes 80-117 and accompanying
text (discussing these subsequent cases). These contrary holdings echo the majority in Meyer
rather than Harlan in dissent here. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text (on Meyer).
60 See Poe, 367 U.S. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 546-547, 552, 553.
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point that a particular social "judgment [on that topic] is no more demonstrably
correct or incorrect than are the varieties of judgment, expressed in law, on
marriage and divorce... abortion, and sterilization or euthanasia and suicide."62
In this first reference, Harlan acknowledges that social views on these topics are
subjective and evolutionary rather than natural or static-not surprisingly, a key
aspect of the Lawrence ruling nearly half a century later-and that judges
therefore should not displace majoritarian social policies merely on the basis of
their personal politics or preferences. In the second instance, Harlan
acknowledges a related point-that privacy is "not absolute"--and then he again
provides illustrative examples, explaining that he, Harlan, was not then prepared
to "suggest" as a justice that "homosexuality" is immune to "criminal enquiry"
along with "adultery... fornication and incest."63 Thus, in the first two instances,
Harlan's point was that same-sex relations, like other fields of human life, are
open to controversy and judges should exercise their power of review judiciously
in light of this fluid social pluralism.
In the third instance, Harlan clarifies why, at that time, he would distinguish
"adultery, homosexuality and the like" from "marriage" in his hypothetical
application of this proposed framework: the former, he explains, are "extra-
marital" 64 expressions of sexuality and thus form part of a larger categorical
scheme in which Harlan regards "marital" and "non-marital" statuses as
essentially different for constitutional purposes-a difference that his successors
explicitly rejected later in Eisenstadt, Carey, Roe and other cases that follow from
Meyer-Pierce and that, at times, even quote to Harlan's dissent in the process of
doing so. Indeed, the open-ended and flexible approach that Harlan laid out in his
Poe dissent based on Meyer-Pierce recognized and helped to establish the basic
methodology for precisely this sort of jurisprudential evolution over the
generations, and in the tracks of social and societal evolution-the very kind of
sociolegal evolution that the Lawrence majority opinion notes and illustrates.
Thus, even though Harlan in dissent has influenced subsequent liberty-privacy
law through the principles and methodology he set out in this case, his casual
applications of the framework in Poe to the hypothesized scenarios he invoked by
bare terms like "homosexuality" or "adult consensual homosexuality" or other
forms of "extra-marital" choices had been rejected authoritatively, and repeatedly,
long before five justices in Bowers belatedly attempted to resurrect and impose
this very same constriction in the 1980s.
Thus, not much can be extrapolated from this abstract discussion to
single out "homosexuality" from the other categories or examples with which
Harlan had commingled it in his Poe dissent. Although his basic approach or
methodology has been embraced and employed by other judges in subsequent
62 Id. at 547.
63 Id. at 552.
64 Id. at 553.
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liberty-privacy cases, they have done so time and again to draw conclusions
diametrically opposite to those that Harlan had hypothesized in this 1961 dissent.
Indeed, the cases from Griswold in 1965 to Hardwick in 1985 make one
fundamental point quite, and consistently, plain about Harlan's Poe dissent:
despite his assertions to the contrary there, individual liberty-privacy rights
emphatically do not depend on categorical divides or classifications based on
social statuses, such as the "marital" versus "extramarital" categories that he had
posited in his dissent's hypothetical discussion.
The disposition of Poe on standing grounds, coupled with the Meyer-Pierce
precedents and the Douglas-Harlan dissents, established the general parameters of
liberty-privacy as the 1960s commenced. By then, those rulings and opinions had
made three foundational points clear: (1) privacy was a Due Process element of
liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) it protects individual efforts to exert
choice over the direction of destiny; and (3) the cases decided thus far did not
represent an effort to "define" the limits of liberty-privacy. In addition, the Harlan
dissent had set out a methodological "framework" based on the precedents to date
that specifically rejected a strict or "literalistic" approach to future liberty-privacy
cases, and that called for a sound and evolutionary jurisprudence recognizing and
protecting what he termed the "compendious notion of 'liberty' embraced in the
Fourteenth Amendment."65
2. Griswold to Hardwick: Establishing the Equality ofLiberty-Privacy
With Meyer, Pierce and Poe in place, the "modem" era of liberty-privacy
jurisprudence was set to dawn later that same decade-a time vibrating culturally
and politically with calls for "sexual liberation." These calls found social
expression in the various movements and communities spearheaded by women
and sexual minorities during those times. 66 These calls, inevitably, also found
legal expression in actions brought before federal courts on the basis of the
precedents and opinions sketched above. Four years later, with the Griswold
litigation having wound its way to them, the Supreme Court justices might well
have been experiencing a goodly case ofjurisprudential ddjd vu.
Griswold v. Connecticut. In Griswold, personnel of the local Planned
Parenthood clinic had been convicted as accessories under the Connecticut statute
criminalizing the use of contraceptives; their crime had been to provide married
persons with information to prevent conception.67 The state and lower federal
65 Poe, 367 U.S. at 544 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
66 See, e.g., KATE MILLET, SEXUAL POLITICS (1969) (focusing on cross-sex relations);
JOHN D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A HOMOSEXUAL
MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1970 (1983) (focusing on same-sex relations); JOH-N
D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATrERS: A HISTORY OF SEXUALFI Y IN
AMERICA (1988) (providing a general historical account, and cited by the judges in Lawrence).
67 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480.
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courts upheld the convictions.68 On appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Douglas
wrote for five members of the Court holding that the statute invaded "privacy"
rights reflected in various textual provisions in the Bill of Rights and their
"penumbras," specifically the text of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth
Amendments, as well as precedents like Pierce and Meyer.69 Justice Goldberg
wrote for himself and two others, also specifically rooting "privacy" in the
"liberty" provision of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and its
incorporation of other Bill of Rights protections while emphasizing equally the
text and legislative history of the Ninth Amendment's declaration that "[t]he
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people."'70 Justice Harlan concurred in the
judgment but, reflecting his Poe dissent, objected to its grounding in the Bill of
Rights and their incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment, writing that
privacy "is not dependent on them or any of their radiations;" instead, Harlan
reiterated, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause "stands... on its
own bottom" to protect "basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty."''71 Justice White, also concurring in the judgment, grounded privacy
squarely in the liberty protection of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause, and on the Pierce-Meyer and related precedents. 72 Thus, of the four
opinions, three emphasized the liberty provision of the Fourteenth Amendment;73
while Douglas' opinion for the Court enabled exaggerated attention to the
"penumbras" of the Bill of Rights, the due process liberty text was central to the
reasoning and conclusion of the majority that formed the Griswold holding. In
addition, none sought to cabin privacy strictly or exclusively within marital
scenarios, nor did any seek to contradict or qualify the open-ended or
"compendious notion" of liberty-privacy that Pierce-Meyer had recognized in the
1920s and that Harlan's dissent in Poe had named just four years earlier. To the
contrary, though the justices focused on the facts actually before them-married
persons seeking access to contraception-they did so to reject a majoritarian
effort professedly aimed at defending married persons from the corruption of their
intimacies as a matter of public policy. As in Meyer and Pierce, Griswold rejected
majoritarian moralism in the form of public policy as sufficient justification for
the regulation of individual liberty or choice relating to private relations, including
the liberty to reject procreation as an imperative of married life.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 481-86.
70 Id. at 486-88 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
71 Id. at 499-502 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)).
72 Id. at 502-07 (White, J., concurring).
73 Ironically, in light of his Poe concurrence expressly invoking liberty under due process,
in Griswold all the opinions did likewise except for Douglas'-who here also wrote for the
Court. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing Douglas' opinion in Poe).
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Loving v. Virginia. Two years later, in Loving v. Virginia,74 the Court again
confronted majoritarian moralism packaged as public policy, this time in the form
of a state statute prohibiting the marriage of persons classified as white to persons
classified as nonwhite.75 Reflecting the facts thus presented, the justices in Loving
focused on marital choices, rather than, say, educational choices. But in applying
to these facts the underlying purpose of liberty-privacy as set forth in the Pierce-
Meyer precedents, the Loving justices recognized that control over personal
choices was the gravamen of the claims here much as they had been in those
precedents. 76 Framing their holding in Loving accordingly, the justices concluded
that the right to make decisions regarding race and marriage "resides with the
individual and cannot be infringed by the State" to trump their choices, even
through formally democratic majoritarian lawmaking. 77 This statute, the justices
quickly noted, transgressed both the right of choice as applied to marriage, which
is protected by the Due Process Clause, as well as the right to equality protected
by the Equal Protection Clause. 78 On both counts, the justices held, the
Fourteenth Amendment barred this state effort to regulate, on the basis of race,
the personal acts and choices of individuals relating to sexual intimacy and
affectional bonding within the specific factual context of marriage. 79
Eisenstadt v. Baird Next, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,80 the justices once again
faced a majoritarian regulation of individual liberty or choice aimed at private
relations or interactions, reviewing a Massachusetts statute that criminalized the
provision of contraceptive devices and information to unmarried adults-a
prohibition that, technically, fit within the letter or facts of Griswold because it
implicated non-marital recreational sexuality.81 When a lecturer was convicted
under the statute after handing a container of contraceptive foam to a woman after
a public event, the state courts and federal district court upheld the conviction.82
However, by that time, 1972, the Supreme Court could not square differential
treatment of individual liberty-privacy rights based on marital status with other
provisions of the Constitution, even though the record of this case did not
establish the marital status of the foam recipient.
Two justices did not participate in the adjudication of this case; of the
remaining seven, four joined Justice Brennan's plurality opinion focusing on
equality of "privacy" as it had been defined in Griswold, and thus on the Equal
74 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
75 Loving, 388 U.S. at 2.
7 6 1d. at 12.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 11-12.
7 9 Id.
80 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
81 Id. at 440.
82 Id.
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Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 83 Justice Douglas' concurrence
joined the Brennan opinion but additionally focused on the public aspects of the
lecture in the case and on the "narrower ground" of First Amendment protection
of expression.84 Justice White also concurred, but on the grounds that the state's
restriction on distribution and information regarding contraceptives "burdens the
constitutional rights of married persons to use contraceptives. '85 Once again,
therefore, the majority of the participating justices had pointed explicitly to the
liberty text of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause as the
substantive basis for their privacy holdings, this time in conjunction with the
equality text of that same Amendment. And once again, though some justices
focused on marital status, the facts and outcome of the case confirmed that
marriage and procreation did not cabin liberty-privacy.
The obvious and key question after Griswold, which Eisenstadt answered in
the negative, was "whether there is some ground of difference that rationally
explains the different treatment accorded married and unmarried persons" in
privacy cases. 86 In concluding not, Eisenstadt clarified the relationship between
privacy and equality with the following formulation, and with emphasis in the
original: "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child." 87 With this open-ended formulation and outcome, Eisenstadt
expressly proffers the facts before it as one example of "decisions" that
"fundamentally affect" an "individual" and that therefore are protected by
"liberty" to allow individuated choices over individual destinies.
The Eisenstadt justices thus continued the open-ended and flexible approach
to liberty-privacy established jurisprudentially in Pierce-Meyer, described initially
by Harlan's dissent in Poe, and then continued substantively in Griswold and
Loving. In Eisenstadt, as in all the cases before it, the justices made no effort to
cabin Due Process strictly to the facts before them, even as they focused on them
to articulate and apply the larger principles and concerns over social destiny that
had shaped the precedents from inception. With this formulation, the justices in
Eisenstadt, like those in Meyer and Loving, again explicitly identified the
"individual" as the bearer of liberty-privacy rights and, responding to the facts
before them, this time they also stressed that liberty-privacy rights vested whether
the individual is "married or single."88
83 Id at 446-55.
84 Id at 455-60 (Douglas, J., concurring).
85 Id. at 460-65 (White, J., concurring).
86 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 447.
87 Id. at 453.
88 Id.
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Thus, in Eisenstadt, the equality implications of liberty-privacy came into full
view, and the inter-linked centrality of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses to this liberty-privacy-equality analysis became
substantially clear. In Eisenstadt, a plurality of the Court recognized that the
privacy right of its Griswold ruling must be acknowledged as vesting in all
individuals, regardless of marital status, because to do otherwise would create an
Equal Protection anomaly in which the constitutional rights of otherwise
identically situated individuals would turn on the fortuity of marital status: If
"privacy" is an individual "liberty" that the state can regulate only through
narrowly tailored means upon its showing of a compelling state interest, what
could be the justification for a blanket exclusion from that right of all except the
formally married? 89 Thus, under the joint operation of Griswold and Eisenstadt,
the federal Constitution was held effectively and literally to shield the sexual
intimacies of cross-sex couplings from most kinds of state interference, even if
the couplings were constituted by unmarried individuals avowedly for non-
procreational purposes.90 The following year, 1973, the Court in Roe v. Wade91
again focused on the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of "liberty" to elaborate
"privacy" as an individual right protecting non-procreational choices and acts that
vested in all individuals independently of marital status-in this instance,
individual women constituting a distinct social group.92
Roe v. Wade. More so than the other "privacy" cases, Roe v. Wade93 involved
control over bodies, women's bodies. In Roe, the Court considered a physician's
challenge of a Texas ban on abortions and overturned the law as an unwarranted
majoritarian intrusion into the reproductive choices of women opting for the
termination of their pregnancies. 94 The ruling, written by Justice Blackmun,
canvassed and relied both on the history of abortion's regulation and on the
89 The Eisenstandt majority apparently understood that no other answer could be given to
this question. Indeed, to answer this question positively would impose a formal inequality based
on the fortuities of shifting statuses regarding formal marriage in an increasingly socially
mobile society; in such a society, the Eisenstadt justices seem to have recognized, the
application of sexual regulations cannot hinge on status as single, divorced or married.
Ultimately, the Eisenstadt justices--unlike the Bowers justices-seem to have appreciated the
oddness of creating an Equal Protection anomaly by judicial mandate. See infra notes 166-70
and accompanying text (discussing Bowers' creation of precisely this type of anomaly).
90 In both Griswold and Eisenstadt, the protected individual choice was to opt against
procreation. See supra notes 67-73 and 80-89 and accompanying text (discussing Griwsold
and Eisenstadt).
91 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
92 While in Eisenstadt the justices had addressed marital status and in Loving they had
addressed inter-racial marriage, the facts in this case, prompted the high Court, for the first time
in the Griswold line, to focus on women as a cognizable, though internally diverse, identity
group.
93 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
94 Roe, 410 U.S. at 120.
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rulings outlined here, and concluded: "This right of privacy, whether it be
founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty ... as we
feel it is, or... in the Ninth [Amendment] ..., is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."95 In so doing, Roe
made the meaning of "liberty" under the Due Process Clause yet clearer: whether
by intrusion, prohibition or other means, legislative majorities in control of the
state cannot simply subordinate the individual's capacity for free choice in
matters of physical intimacy or personal autonomy to serve their own policy
preferences, even if invoked under the rubric of morality or moral choices;
choices that "fundamentally affect" destiny reside with the individual.
As with the preceding liberty-privacy cases, the opinions in Roe (and its
companion case) continued the ongoing discussion among the justices over the
grounding of privacy in varied provisions of the Constitution. For instance, both
Chief Justice Burger 96 and Justice Stewart97 filed concurrences grounded
specifically in the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty provision while Justice
Douglas filed a concurrence emphasizing both the Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments, as well as other provisions of the Constitution.98 In this way, Roe
(and its companion) confirmed what the prior cases seemed to establish in varied
factual settings: that control over one's body was an aspect of liberty protected
specifically by privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a protection buttressed by other textual provisions of the
Constitution and established sources of sound interpretation. As set forth in the
cases from Griswold to Roe, the liberty provision of the Fourteenth Amendment
provided the chief, but not exclusive, constitutional bulwark against the state
commandeering the intimate life or personal autonomy of an individual to serve
nominally majoritarian policy preferences. Five years later the Court would
confirm precisely this point emphatically in Carey v. Population Services.9 9
Doe v. Commonwealth. In the interim, however, three years after Roe, the
Supreme Court, in a summary affirmance, left standing the conclusion of a three-
judge special district court upholding Virginia's sodomy statute as applied to
homosexual acts.100 In Doe v. Commonwealth, a district court rejected sexual
minority privacy claims based on the traditionalist focus on marriage and
procreation found in the Griswold line of cases-and in apparent disregard' 0' of
95 Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
96 410 U.S. 113,207 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
97 Id at 167 (Stewart, J., concurring).
98 Id at 209 (Douglas, J., concurring).
99 431 U.S. 678 (1977). See infra notes 105-13 and accompanying text (discussing
Carey).
100 Doe v. Commonwealth, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), afTd, 425 U.S. 901
(1976).
101 Seeid. at 1200-03.
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the facts and outcomes in Eisenstadt and Roe02 But in its rush to judgment, the
district court also had strained the limits of standing law under extremely
questionable facts akin to those that had prompted the Supreme Court to avert a
ruling on the merits in Poe fifteen years earlier. 10 3 The Supreme Court's
summary affirmance of Doe's outcome on direct appeal, and in light of its then-
fresh rulings in Eisenstandt and Roe, had left unclear the basis for its action:
whether the summary upholding of Doe's result was based on the Supreme
Court's implicit conclusion that the Doe plaintiff had lacked standing despite the
trial court's finding to the contrary-much like they had done in Poe fifteen years
earlier when they concluded that standing lacked there on similar facts-or
whether the summary upholding affirmed the district judges' rejection on the
merits of the substantive Due Process claim presented there, based on their
application of the liberty-privacy precedents decided thus far, including
Eisenstadt and Roe. Under these circumstances-which later were to become
significant-Doe's precedential effect on Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence
was left in doubt.10 4
Carey v. Population Services. The next year, 1977, Griswold's equality
implications emerged again in the case that emphatically confirmed the
"compendious notion" of Due Process undergirding liberty-privacy jurisprudence
since at least the 1920s, and that made clear that the traditionalist passages of the
precedents were reflections of factual scenarios and were not to be mistaken as
affirmative restrictions on the protection of sexual privacy as an aspect of
personal liberty. In Carey, a New York statute criminalized, among other things,
the provision of contraceptives to persons under the age of sixteen, defined as
minors.' 05 An out-of-state corporation advertising contraceptives in New York
102 In this way, Doe illustrates the capacity of judges to exalt the traditionalist passages
beckoned by the facts of those cases to elide the expansive passages that convey their
emancipatory conclusions and holdings. This manipulation of the precedents is made possible,
of course, by their apparent ambivalence. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text
(discussing ambivalence in liberty-privacy jurisprudence).
103 The plaintiffs there had not been arrested for violations of the statute, nor did they
present any evidence of threatened prosecutions under the statute. At most, the plaintiffs had a
"generalized grievance" regarding the statute. See Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1207
n.5 (1 th Cir. 1985) (describing the Doe standing facts).
104 Invoking canons of judicial interpretation, the Eleventh Circuit took Doe as an
affirmance based on a lack of standing rather than based on a rejection of privacy:
Where, as in the Doe case, the facts of the case plainly reveal a basis for the lower court's
decision more narrow that the issues listed in the jurisdictional statement, a lower court
should presume that the Supreme Court decided the case on that narrow ground. We
therefore construe Doe as an affirmance based on the plaintiffs' lack of standing and not
controlling in this case.
Id. at 1208. See also infra notes 118-36 and accompanying text (discussing the Eleventh
Circuit's ruling in Hardwick).
105 431 U.S. 678, 682 (1977).
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periodicals, together with other plaintiffs, challenged the statute's
constitutionality. 106 Another special three-judge federal district court clearly
understood the logic of privacy and equality established by Griswold, Eisenstadt
and Roe, and, relying on those precedents, held the New York Act
unconstitutional under both the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 107
On direct appeal to the Supreme Court, the state in effect argued that Meyer-
Pierce, Griswold, Eisenstadt and Roe could not possibly mean what they had
jointly and sometimes literally said: that privacy vests in the individual, regardless
of marital status or procreational choice. Emphasizing Eisenstadt, the Court's
response identified a "fatal fallacy" in the state's argument: "Griswold may no
longer be read as holding only that a State may not prohibit a married couple's
use of contraceptives. Read in light of its progeny, the teaching of Griswold is that
the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of childbearing from
unjustified intrusion by the State."' 1 8 The justices once again were unable to
agree on a single rationale or source for the grounding of liberty-privacy rights in
the Constitution's text or design, prompting concurrences by White, Powell and
Stevens, as well as a dissent by Rehnquist-joined by no other justice-that
decried the ruling and attempted to cast Doe's summary affirmance the previous
year as a ruling on the merits that "definitively established" the exclusion of
sexual minorities from liberty-privacy protection as a matter of law.
Nonetheless, seven of the nine justices agreed that the contraception ban on
minors-including, apparently, unmarried minors109-was unconstitutional
under the protection of liberty afforded by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, thus affirming once again the centrality of the "liberty"
text to privacy analysis and the open-ended methodology employed to preserve
individual autonomy over personal decisions that, in social context, are likely to
fundamentally affect the course of a person's destiny. The Court's opinion in
Carey, penned by Justice Brennan, begins with the following observation:
[T]he Court has recognized that one aspect of the "liberty" protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a "right of personal privacy, or a
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy." This right of personal privacy
includes "the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important
106 Id. at 682 n.2.
107 Id. at 681
108 Id. at 687 (emphasis added).
109 Though the recited facts are not specific on this point, it appears the statute regulated
minors without regard to their individuated marital status, and the justices clearly did not
conclude that the liberty-privacy rights of minors under Griswold and its predecessors or
progeny were constitutionally contingent upon their actual or formal personal status as married
or unmarried individuals. Thus, liberty-equality apparently vests fully and equally even in
unmarried minors to protect them from becoming "mere creatures" of the state or majoritarian
policy preferences. See supra note 44-45 and accompanying text (discussing this point in
Meyer-Pierce).
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decisions." While the outer limits of this aspect of privacy have not been marked
by the Court, it is clear that among the decisions that an individual may make
without unjustified government interference are personal decisions "relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and
education.", 10
This formulation underscores the one in Eisenstadt in several key ways, and
reinforces the same basic points established or illustrated by the precedents since
the 1920s.
Carey's formulation made clear that liberty-privacy constituted a "zone" of
constitutional protection for "certain kinds of important decisions" cohered by
constitutional protection of individual autonomy over personal destiny rather
than-to return to Harlan's memorable description-merely "isolated points
pricked out" by judges in random reaction to the facts of cases or to specific text
in the Bill of Rights.' As in Meyer-Pierce and Eisenstadt, this language further
made clear that "the outer limits of this [protection] have not been marked by the
Court," but that among these "important decisions" are the exemplars presented
by the facts of the earlier cases: "personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and
education." 1 ' 2 Grounding itself firmly in the facts and outcomes of the liberty-
privacy precedents, Carey thus made clear yet again that liberty-privacy was
rooted in the Due Process Clause, applied equally to all individuals regardless of
marital status-including (unmarried) minors-and encompassed a coherent
"zone" of constitutional protection for "important decisions" of a "personal"
nature.
Of course, Carey, like Griswold and its other progeny, exalted traditional
expressions of these "important decisions"-most ubiquitously, marriage-but,
notably, did so to conclude that individuals hold privacy rights qua individuals,
and independently of age or marital status. Thus, marriage and procreation indeed
were oftentimes salient in the facts or rationales of those cases, but not to their
outcome, which oftentimes struck down majoritarian actions putatively designed
to protect conventional forms of marriage and associated traditions from any
potentially corrupting source. As with its predecessors since Griswold, Carey
therefore points to marriage and its adjuncts as the basic and most ubiquitous
historical paradigm for the constitutional protection of personal liberty in sexual
relations, but not as its exclusive setting. As a whole, this line of cases shows that,
as with all constitutional principles, liberty-privacy exists beyond the specific
0 Carey, 431 U.S. at 684-85 (citations omitted).
I See infra note 113 (elaborating this flexible, "compendious notion" of liberty-privacy).
112 Carey, 431 U.S. at 684-85 (citations omitted).
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examples or "dots" that have helped to elucidate it in various factual and legal
settings. 113
Nonetheless, these cases also might be said to present an arguably or
apparently ambivalent normative mix reminiscent of Lawrence's own
equivocations. 1 14 On the one hand, the cases recognized that privacy rights must
inhere in all individuals equally to avoid Equal Protection anomalies. On the other
hand, the cases oftentimes highlighted marriage and procreation in the process.
Technically, Griswold and progeny perhaps had merely recognized constitutional
protection of discrete "decisions" and "choices" regarding contraceptive "use"
and "information" or "distribution" and "access" and expressly had not
"definitively answered the difficult question whether and to what extent the
Constitution [protects private consensual sexual behavior] among adults."1 15
Yet Griswold and its progeny (up to Bowers) also had made quite plain that
privacy and equality worked in tandem and that marriage was an illustrative
exemplar, but not a condition precedent, to Equal Protection of privacy rights. In
other words, the privacy rights illustrated in Griswold and progeny by the
marriage relationship inhered in all individuals equally, including (unmarried)
minors, and applied to all choices, including those that were not procreational.
The same can be said about the pre-Griswold majority rulings of the 1920s that,
in the form of precedent, had set the stage for liberty-privacy jurisprudential
developments since. Up to this point, and despite the apparent ambivalence
embedded in the facts and texts of these cases, the law's ongoing development
consequently pointed toward a fairly consistent and coherent elaboration of
liberty-privacy that accepted and employed the social and personal benefits
conventionally associated with traditional marriage as a basic framework for
113 See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). This very point
was made express early on in the liberty-privacy jurisprudence in Harlan's Poe dissent when
laying out his framework for constitutional analysis, specifically, of the "compendious notion"
of liberty-privacy he elaborated there. See id. at 544. Canvassing the precedents and noting that
they represented a "continuum" of protected individual choices rather than "isolated points
pricked out" from the Constitution's text or other sources of law, Harlan explains that the law's
"general language should not, therefore, be necessarily confined .... [Instead] [a] principle, to
be vital, must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth." Id at 543,
551 (citations omitted). To do otherwise in this jurisprudential context, he reasoned, "would
surely be an extreme instance of sacrificing substance to form." Id. This sort of flexible
interpretative approach to liberty-privacy mirrors John Marshall's earlier dismissal of "narrow"
or "strict" construction of federal power in favor of a "just" or "sound" approach designed to
ensure that governmental powers are able to accomplish their "great objects," including, in the
instance of civil rights, the power to promulgate and enforce equality. See Valdes, We Have
Held, supra note 11.
114 See supra notes 1-24 and accompanying text (discussing the case law's apparent
ambivalence).
115 Carey, 431 U.S. at 695 n.17.
2004] 1373
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
making the accepted joys of that paradigm equally accessible to all individuals
regardless, respectively, of their age, gender marital status, or race.' 1 6
This apparently ambivalent mix of traditional instrumentalism and social
emancipation was the substantive state of liberty-privacy-equality law as the
Bowers litigation worked its way through the federal court system. This mixture
gave tremendous discretion--even license-to newly-installed justices keen on
backlash, because it facilitated a strategic emphasis on marriage and procreation
(and a corresponding neglect of contrary outcomes, language and logic) to alter
jurisprudential trajectories diametrically. 117 The final result in Bowers willfully
exploited this mix; as a relatively early exercise of might in the context of
growing kulturkampf, the Bowers justices scrambled these jurisprudential lines
almost beyond recognition.
Hardwick v. Bowers. In this litigation Michael Hardwick challenged a
Georgia statute criminalizing "any sexual act involving the sex organs of one
person and the mouth or anus of another."' 118 This definition of "sodomy"
effectively prohibited all penises in Georgia from coming into any contact with
the mouth or anus of another anywhere in Georgia, regardless of the sex or
marital status of the bodies to which the mouth or anus might belong. The statute,
in other words, completely banned both cross-sex and same-sex versions of
intimacy other than "traditional" sexual intercourse. Although the antiquated
statute remained largely unenforced, Hardwick had been arrested under the statute
when a police officer entered his bedroom early one morning, ostensibly serving
an arrest warrant based on a traffic ticket that in fact already had been paid, and
stayed there unobserved long enough to witness oral sex between two adult
men. 119 As a result, Hardwick challenged the statute, and was joined in that case
by friends who were a cross-sex couple intending to engage in similar forms of
proscribed sex but "chilled" from doing so by the fear of incarceration triggered
by their friend's arrest under the statute. 120
The facts of this case thereby raised the equality question again, and
pointedly: 121 whether Eisentstadt's conclusion that "the right of the individual,
116 See supra notes 74-113 and accompanying text (discussing the cases from Carey back
to Loving).
117 This occurred in Doe. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text (discussing
Doe).
118 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 187 n.1 (1986)
119 For a widely noted account, see PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS:
SIXTEEN AMERICANS WHO FOUGHT THEIR WAY TO THE SUPREME COURT 379-403 (1988).
120 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 187 n.2. ("John and Mary Doe... alleged... that they had been
'chilled and deterred' from engaging in such activity by both the existence of the statute and
Hardwick's arrest.").
121 The question, again, was whether marriage and procreation epitomized or delimited
the liberty-privacy rights of the Due Process Clause and other constitutional provisions. See
supra notes 29-117 and accompanying text (discussing the prior case law).
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married or single, to be free of unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child" really included all "individuals" equally.' 22 Eisenstadt had answered the
question positively when the question involved non-marital status and the activity
was non-procreational.123 Later, both Carey and Roe also had answered this
question in the affirmative when the social groups were "minors" and "women"
and the activity also was non-procreational.124 Loving previously also had
answered likewise when the classification implicated "race" in the choice of
coupling. 25 But leaning on Doe126-while blithely disregarding the significance
of Eisenstadt, Roe and Carey--the state in Bowers argued that the answer must
be different when the social group is called "homosexuals" and the non-
procreational choice or act is labeled "homosexual sodomy."' 127 This substantive
state of the law is what led the Eleventh Circuit to correctly decide the Hardwick
case in 1985, by citing to the then-recent and contrary explanation in Carey of
Griswold and its liberty-privacy successors, 128 when that court rejected the state
Attorney General's attempt to impose a constrictive-and contrary-
interpretation of Griswold and its progeny
Foreshadowing the Supreme Court's belated self-correction in Lawrence,]29
the Eleventh Circuit's ruling in the Hardwick litigation reasoned that "[e]ven if
Doe had been resolved on the constitutional grounds now" being raised by
Hardwick, doctrinal developments since 1976's summary affirmance provided
surer analytical footing.' 30 Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit cited Carey-
decided the year after Doe-and its line of privacy-liberty companions to
conclude that "[t]he Constitution prevents the States from unduly interfering in
certain individual decisions critical to personal autonomy because those decisions
are essentially private and beyond the legitimate reach of a civilized society.' 131
To arrive at this conclusion the Eleventh Circuit undertook a laborious analysis of
the case law, focusing on Griswold, Eisenstandt and Carey to observe that "[t]he
intimate association protected against state interference does not exist in the
122 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
123 Id. at 454.
124 Carey, 431 U.S. at 702; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 152-53 (1973).
125 See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text (discussing Loving).
126 See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text (discussing Doe).
127 Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1211-12 (11 th Cir. 1985).
12 8 1d.
129 Perhaps the notion of "self-correction" must be qualified, given the ways in which
Lawrence and its predecessors exude instrumentalism based on "traditional marriage" and
related symbols, which enable backlashing judges and politicians to circumvent the proper
emancipatory potential of liberty-privacy. See supra notes 1-24 and accompanying text
(discussing the ambivalence and manipulation of this jurisprudence).
13 0 See Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1208-10.
131 Id. at 1211.
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marriage relationship alone"132-a point already explicitly underscored and
factually illustrated by Eisenstadt, Roe and Carey. Continuing, the Eleventh
Circuit noted that, "[tjhe benefits of marriage can inure to individuals outside the
traditional marital relationship. For some, the sexual activity in question [in
Hardwick] serves the same purpose as the intimacy of marriage."' 133 The Eleventh
Circuit thereby correctly concluded that liberty-privacy rights do not turn on
social identities, or on marital status or procreational intent, as the precedents up
to that point had uniformly held and illustrated.
The Eleventh Circuit then focused on the spatial dimensions of privacy in that
case. Analogizing to Stanley v. Georgia,134 a First Amendment case prohibiting
the criminalization of in-home use of pornography, the Eleventh Circuit
continued:
In addition to the resemblance between Hardwick's conduct and the intimate
association of marriage, we pay heed to the fact that he plans to carry out his
sexual activity in private .... [T]he constitutional protection of privacy reaches
its height when the state attempts to regulate an activity in the home. 135
Presaging Lawrence, the Eleventh Circuit in this passage made plain that the
spatial dimension of privacy was "in addition" to the substantive protection of
"personal autonomy" in intimate associations; thus, the Eleventh Circuit correctly
recognized that the spatial element of privacy, like the marital element, does not
serve as a delimitation of the right to personal liberty under the Fourteenth
Amendment but rather operates as a "plus" factor reinforcing constitutional
protection of privacy-liberty rights against majoritarian regulation. 136
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit in Hardwick correctly discerned that Griswold and
progeny jointly had (1) employed "marriage" and "procreation" as illustrative
exemplars, not exhaustive listings, of the intimate associations or personal choices
through which individuals enjoy equal liberty-privacy rights regardless of social
identity or procreational intent; (2) employed the home as the quintessential but
not required space in which sexual liberty rights may be enjoyed in private; (3)
132 Id at 1212.
133 Id.
134 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
135 Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1212.
136 As Griswold itself vividly illustrates, the Fourth Amendment's protection of the home
against unreasonable searches and seizures and other coercive intrusions always has been a
central aspect of liberty-privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
This "spatial" dimension of privacy is rooted expressly in that Amendment, while the
"autonomy" dimension of privacy is rooted chiefly in the Fourteenth Amendment, as
supplemented by other provisions of the Bill of Rights and related sources of constitutional
analysis, such as "history and tradition." Id at 481-85. For a more detailed review of "history
and tradition" as a source of constitutional analysis in liberty-privacy jurisprudence, see Valdes,
We Have Held, supra note 11.
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employed constitutional text in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment
to ground liberty-privacy; and (4) averted the construction of an equality anomaly
by recognizing the equality of singles, minors, women and nonwhites as
individuals holding privacy rights on par with "traditional" married couples. In
every key respect, the Lawrence ruling tracks the Eleventh Circuit's Hardwick
ruling, and in doing so the current Supreme Court clarifies that the Eleventh
Circuit's comprehension of liberty-privacy under Griswold and progeny in 1985
was-and always has been--correct. Through Lawrence, even the Supreme
Court now admits that the Eleventh Circuit had substantively applied the
controlling precedents from above-Griswold, Loving, Eisenstadt, Roe and
Carey--to arrive at the analytically correct, and judicially principled, bottom line.
3. Bowers v. Hardwick: Disestablishing the Equality of Liberty-Privacy
When Hardwick's case arrived at the steps of the Supreme Court in the mid-
1980s, the consequences of backlash kulturkampf in the politics of federal judicial
appointments during the previous decade or two came sharply into view: four of
the five justices in the bare Bowers majority were installed into power by
politicians explicitly voicing their use of judicial appointments to cabin civil
rights and expand "states rights" through strict construction of federal powers
when they are deployed to help protect individual rights and liberties against
encroachment by local and "traditional" elites in control of state and local
governments.137 These appointments generated a scandalously unsound decision
that immediately and increasingly became notorious as a classic venting of
societal and judicial homophobia under the guise of law. To do so, the Bowers
majority undertook three principal maneuvers: (1) re-framing the plaintiffs
complaint to produce a focus on "homosexual sodomy" despite the statute's
application to cross-sex sodomy; (2) invoking "history and tradition" as a block to
"judicial activism" in liberty-privacy jurisprudence; (3) centering the need for
judicial deference to "democracy" and "presumed" moral beliefs enacted into law
through majoritarian politics. Along the way, the five justices who ruled the day
in Bowers also created the jurisprudential anomaly--entrenching formal
inequality based on sexual orientation-that Lawrence now ends. Indeed, the five
justices in Bowers used that case to attempt to bring a halt to, if not a reversal of,
liberty-privacy cases under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause,
which stretch back for the better part of a century since Meyer.
137 The four were Burger (Nixon), Rehnquist (Nixon), Powell (Nixon) and O'Connor
(Reagan). For a review of judicial appointments and backlash kulturkampf, see Valdes,
Cultural Warriors, supra note 13, at 1440-43 and sources cited therein (on same). See also
HERMAN SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO REWRITE THE
CONSTITUTION (1988). For a remarkable insider's account of the appointment to the Court of its
current Chief Justice, see generally JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD
STORY OF THE NIXON APPOINTMENT THAT REDEFINED THE SUPREME COURT (2002).
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To get there, four members of the Court joined an opinion by Justice White
framing the case in two parts, both of which are key to the jurisprudence of
backlash that Bowers helped set into motion. The first part centered on cultural
notions of homosexual identity, apparently harbored by the quintet of justices in
the Bowers majority, and formed the core of their conclusions. The second trained
attention on institutional concerns over judicial legitimacy when interpreting the
Constitution in a society dedicated to democracy, and labors to provide additional
rationale for their conclusions. The first enabled the justices to bootstrap into law
their social perceptions and prejudices along the identity-rooted fault lines of the
culture wars, whereas the second became a textbook example of, and precedent
for, future jurisprudential plays of this sort in pursuit of backlash kulturkampf.138
The first part of the Bowers ruling focused itself on whether "the Federal
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in
sodomy," and the second part focused itself on "the limits of the Court's role in
carrying out its constitutional mandate." 139
a. The Justices' Opinions in Bowers: The Arrest of the Law
Justice White's majority opinion began by re-describing the Griswold line of
precedents, aiming specifically to "register [those five justices'] disagreement"
with the Eleventh Circuit's understanding of those cases. 140 Announcing that "the
reach of this line of cases was sketched in Carey," the Bowers justices endeavored
to mark Carey itself as the final articulation, and final "reach," of liberty-privacy
under due process jurisprudence. 14 1 But rather than describe the due process
precedents as Meyer, Griswold, Eisenstadt and Carey had-as a coherent yet
flexible whole based chiefly on constitutional language that expressly did not
attempt to delimit or mark the "outer limits" of liberty-privacy-the Bowers
majority summarily recast them, in brief descriptive capsules, as atomized
examples of discrete "decisions" and "isolated points" (or "dots") to which
protections had somehow attached, perhaps through mere judicial whim. 142 In a
fairly aggressive effort to arrest the further development of liberty-privacy law,
the Bowers quintet sought to deny what Carey and other opinions already had
spelled out in express terms more than once: that "the reach of the line of cases"
from Meyer-Pierce through Griswold and up to Carey were as yet unmarked, and
that the factual examples of the precedents demonstrated, but did not delimit, this
substantively coherent jurisprudential conception--"privacy"---based on the
138 See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text (discussing the culture wars); see also
infra Part II.A.3.a (discussing the Bowers majority's identity-driven approach in their opinion).
139 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986).
140 Id.
141 See id.
142 See id. at 190-91.
1378 [Vol. 65: 1341
ANOMALIES, WARTS AND ALL
Fourteenth Amendment's due process liberty text and other recognized sources of
constitutional law. 143
After that brief (and obligatory) acknowledgement of precedent, the White
opinion summarily (and disingenuously) asserted the following:
Accepting the decisions in these cases and the above description of them, we
think it evident that none of the rights announced in those cases bears any
resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts
of sodomy .... No connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the
one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been
demonstrated .... Moreover, any claim that these cases nevertheless stand for
[this kind of] proposition ... is unsupportable.144
In the paragraphs following these identity-inflected assertions, the Bowers
quintet generously sprinkled their opinion with other conclusory-and factually
or substantively erroneous-assertions regarding history, tradition and
precedent. 145 By the time they were done with the first part of their opinion, the
substantive issues presented by that case-at least as the quintet had chosen to fix
them in identity-based terms-had raised, in their view, "at best, facetious"
claims to equal privacy and liberty. 146
143 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
144 Id at 190-91.
145 For an early and notable example of legal scholarship documenting the historical
errors asserted by the majority and the Burger concurrence, see Anne Goldstein, History,
Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v.
Hardwick, 97 YALEL. J. 1073 (1988).
146 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194. Then, in a maneuver that has come to characterize backlash
jurisprudence, the Bowers justices asserted in the second part of the opinion that fears of
institutional legitimacy also prevented their recognition of equal privacy rights: "The Court is
most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional
law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution." Id. With
this assertion, the Bowers justices strongly implied that liberty-privacy was an illegitimate
judicial fabrication rather than an individual right rooted "in the language or design of the
Constitution." They sought to position themselves and their handiwork in Bowers as
restrained-and hence "principled"-adjudication in contrast to the "liberal" precedents they
had inherited. To do so they worked in that opinion to erase the steady grounding of privacy
analysis squarely in the liberty text of the Fourteenth Amendment, despite the uniformity of
precedents to the contrary. See supra Part ll.A.2 (discussing the Griswold line of cases).
Later in their opinion, the majority turns to privacy's spatial dimension as it occurred in
that case-the invasion of the bedroom. Rebuffing the spatial dimensions of privacy with equal
alacrity, the Bowers quintet casually rejected Stanley's relevance with the formalistic note that
Stanley had been "firmly grounded in the First Amendment," whereas "homosexual sodomy"
was not similarly grounded in the text or design of the Constitution because, well, they
themselves had just declared so a few paragraphs earlier in that remarkable opinion. Bowers,
478 U.S. at 195-96. Thus, the only way that the spatial dimension of privacy under Bowers'
facts could be sustained, the quintet then asserted, was to confer special rights on homosexual
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Tracking his colleagues' identity-driven (re)framing of the issues, 147 Chief
Justice Burger not only joined the White opinion but also filed a separate
concurrence "to underscore [his] view that in constitutional terms there is no such
thing as a fundamental constitutional right to commit homosexual sodomy."'1 48
After much flipping and flopping, Justice Powell also concurred under the
apparent sway of a Mormon clerk with an avid interest in the outcome of this
case 149 but with a proviso that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment might proscribe severe sentences for private, consensual
acts of oral or anal sex. 150
The four remaining justices dissented through an opinion authored by Justice
Blackmun, objecting strongly to the majority's single-minded obsession with
social identities while gliding over the facially sweeping provisions of the statute
as written, and generally echoing the Eleventh Circuit's analysis and holding. 151
With similar objections, Justice Stevens also filed a separate dissent on behalf of
himself and of Justices Brennan and Marshall, noting explicitly that Bowers'
judicial approval of the selective application of this facially sweeping criminal
statute produced a serious equality anomaly under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Stevens dissent presciently warned that because
privacy rights would henceforth be deemed formally unequal based on the sex or
sexual orientation of the bodies involved in a coupling, Bowers created a glaring
and logically untenable separation of liberty-privacy rights already explicitly
recognized for all "individuals" in Meyer, Griswold and their progeny-an undue
and belated jurisprudential anomaly in which identical acts are to be deemed
constitutionally protected or not based solely on classifications like
"heterosexual" or "homosexual. ' 152 With the Bowers' majority's decision, the
meaning of "privacy" under "liberty" was thrown wide open to pave the way for a
reordering of the jurisprudential developments since 1923, which most recently
at-home activity "by [judicial] fiat." Id. at 195. In their own words, and without any sense of
irony, those justices explained that "it would be difficult, except by fiat, to limit the claimed
right to homosexual conduct while leaving exposed to prosecution adultery, incest and other
sexual crimes even though they are committed in the home." Id at 195-96. In so doing, they
also overlooked the deeply rooted relevance of privacy's spatial dimension in U.S. law under
both the Fourteenth and Fourth Amendments; landmark cases like Griswold explicitly rely on
both. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
147 See supra notes 137-46 and accompanying text (discussing Bowers' identity-based
issue framing).
148 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
149 The clerk's interest and influence in the outcome of Michael Hardwick's case are
recounted in Tribe, supra note 7, at 1953-55 (citing to private memorandum between Powell
and the clerk). See also JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 521-24 (1994)
(describing Powell's oscillation and decision in Bowers).
150 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197 (Powell, J., concurring).
151 See id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
152 Id. at 214 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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had culminated in Carey's rather plain explication of the liberty-privacy "zones"
protected by the Due Process Clause.
As was clear to many observers back then,153 and has become even more so
in the intervening years, those five majority justices used Bowers mainly to
bootstrap their own prejudices into the annals of constitutional law and to help
engineer a rollback in the evolution of liberty-privacy jurisprudence specifically,
and of civil rights law in general. As Lawrence has finally acknowledged, but as
scholars pointed out immediately, the majority justices asserted false "history" to
justify their personal predilections in that case.' 54 As the Bowers dissenters had
pointed out, rather than adjudicate justiciable issues as framed by the litigants and
record before them, those five justices willfully reached out from their privileged
perches to recycle homophobic superstitions from the witch-hunt days of our
nation and its antecedents. Brushing aside Griswold and Carey, and claiming in
conclusory fashion that Michael Hardwick's claim was "facetious" based on
personal and societal prejudice, the Bowers quintet threw the evolution of privacy
jurisprudence into disarray and erected the equality anomaly that Eisenstandt and
the Eleventh Circuit had averted. For nearly two decades the justices in the
Bowers majority managed to transmute their personal views and values into the
form of constitutional law in order to arrest the development of liberty-privacy in
ways that can never be fully measured-and all without any serious rebuke from
the coequal branches of government, which likewise are in the grips of this
kulturkampf.155 Thus, apart from the scholarly scom that the majority opinion
and the concurrence so quickly and widely attracted,' 56 the Stevens and
153 Specifically, Justice Stevens spelled it out back in 1986. See infra Part II.A.3.b
(discussing the Stevens dissent in Bowers).
15 4 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 145. Embraced mostly by backlashers, the Bowers
ruling had been greeted with overwhelming skepticism or worse for this and similar reasons. As
the Lawrence majority expressly noted: "In the United States criticism of Bowers has been
substantial and continuing, disapproving of its reasoning in all respects, not just as to its
historical assumptions." Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003). For one such
contemporaneous criticism, see Thomas B. Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick. Precedent by
Personal Predilection, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 648 (1987) (attributing Bowers to the personal
predilection of the quintet making that decision). See also Daniel 0. Conkle, The Second Death
of Substantive Due Process, 62 IND. L.J. 215 (1987) (comparing Bowers to its liberty-privacy
predecessors); Nan Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 53 (1992)
(critiquing the identity politics of the majority opinion).
155 See supra notes 13-21 and accompanying text (describing the culture wars).
156 The Bowers maneuvers were of course recognized for their palpable willfulness from
the outset. See, e.g., Stoddard, supra note 154. This over-reaching is epitomized by plainly false
"history and tradition" intended to buttress those judges' imposition of their own policy
preferences. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 145. It thus was an early example of backlash
activism. See supra note 18. The extent of this widespread scorn and skepticism is reflected in
the frank acknowledgement given to these reactions by the justices in Lawrence. 539 U.S. at
576.
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Blackmun dissents stood as the principal challenge to the constitutional
legitimacy of the backlash politics that Bowers had empowered and epitomized.
b. The Stevens Dissent in Bowers: Getting the Law Right
In Bowers, Justice Stevens succinctly observed the following:
Because the Georgia statute expresses the traditional view that sodomy is an
immoral kind of conduct regardless of the identity of the persons who engage in
it ... a proper analysis of its unconstitutionality requires consideration of two
questions: First, may a State totally prohibit the described conduct by means of a
neutral law applying without exception to all persons subject to its jurisdiction? If
not, may the State save the statute by announcing it will only enforce the law
against homosexuals? 157
In answering these two plain questions, Justice Stevens' dissent notes in turn that
the Griswold line of cases makes two propositions "abundantly clear":
First, the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a
particular practice as immoral is not sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting
miscegenation from constitutional attack. Second, individual decisions by
married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship, even
when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of "liberty" protected by the
Due Process of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this protection extends to
intimate choices by unmarried as well as married persons. . . . The essential
'liberty' that animated the development of the law in cases like Griswold,
Eisenstadt and Carey, surely embraces the right to engage in nonreproductive,
sexual conduct that others may consider offensive or immoral. 158
In this two-step application of the liberty-privacy precedents to the Bowers
facts, Stevens necessarily confronts that each case of the Griswold line had
involved legislation embodying the presumed (or even actual)159 moral choices of
majorities in Connecticut, Massachusetts, Texas, New York and other states. But
the liberty-privacy interest under the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment did
not permit those majoritarian choices to be imposed first on "married persons,"
then on "people of color," then on "unmarried individuals," then on "women"
and, finally, on "minors." Consequently, concluded the Stevens dissent, "it is
perfectly clear that the State of Georgia may not totally prohibit the conduct
proscribed by" its sweeping sodomy statute: liberty-privacy jurisprudence already
157 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158 Id at 216-18 (citations omitted).
159 See supra note 13 (discussing Romer).
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stood in the way.160 To make the point clear, the Stevens dissent noted that
Georgia expressly conceded that "application of the statute to a married couple
'would be unconstitutional' because of the 'right of marital privacy' as identified
by the Court in Griswold."16 1
Stevens then continued to the second step of this analysis:
If the Georgia statute cannot be enforced as it is written-if the conduct it
seeks to prohibit is a protected form of liberty for the vast majority of Georgia's
citizens-the State must assume the burden of justifying a selective application
of its law. Either the persons to whom Georgia seeks to apply its statute do not
have the same interests in "liberty" that others have, or there must be a reason
why the State may be permitted to apply a generally applicable law to certain
persons that it does not apply to others. 162
The Stevens dissent thereby brings out the two constitutional im/possibilities
promoted by the Bowers majority:
The first possibility is plainly unacceptable. Although the meaning of the
principle that "all men are created equal" is not always clear, it surely must mean
that every free citizen has the same interest in "liberty" that the members of the
majority share. From the standpoint of the individual, the homosexual and the
heterosexual have the same interest in deciding how he will live his own life,
and, more narrowly, how he will conduct himself in his personal and voluntary
associations with his companions. State intrusion into the private conduct of
either is equally burdensome.
The second possibility is similarly unacceptable ... The Court has
posited... "the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that
homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable" ... [However,] the Georgia
statute does not single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special
disfavored treatment. 163
As the Stevens dissenters were subtly noting, it took five members of the
nation's highest court to "single out" sexual minorities for "special disfavored
treatment" in 1986.164 To do so, the Bowers quintet had to suffer the construction
of the equality anomaly. Indeed, it is no coincidence that Lawrence not only
closes this anomaly and discards Bowers in definitive terms, but that it also does
so with an affirmative embrace of the "proper analysis" set forth so simply in
160 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
16 1 Id. at 218 n.10.
162 Id. at 218.
163 Id. at 218-19 (citations omitted).
164 Id. at 219.
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Stevens' Bowers dissent.' 65 In sum, as the three justices who signed onto the
Stevens dissent incisively warned, and as the Attorney General of Georgia
conceded on the record, the combined effects of Griswold, Loving, Eisenstadt,
Roe and Carey prevented the logic that Bowers necessitated: constructing a
special constitutional cordon around "married persons" and even "unmarried
persons" (including "minors" and "women") unless those same persons also were
classified as "homosexuals" or identified as such.
c. The Bowers Effect: De Jure Inequality and the Equality Anomaly
After Bowers, therefore, only same-sex intimacy was clearly an open target
for "unwarranted intrusions." After Bowers, the only species of sodomy that a
state could constitutionally target was the same-sex variety. After Bowers and
until Lawrence, a conscientious state legislator wanting to enact anti-sodomy
statutes would logically limit them to the only classification of persons and acts
left out in the cold by Bowers' application of Griswold and its progeny, and by its
conclusory re-interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. After Bowers, a
responsible though heterosexist state legislature would seek to enact laws
precisely akin to the one in force in Texas until Lawrence.166
This anomalous reconfiguration of substantive liberty-privacy law in Bowers'
wake is made clear not only by the Stevens dissent and the Georgia Attorney
General's concession, but also by the ways in which lower courts interpreted
privacy law during the seventeen years between Bowers and now. An illustrative
example is Schochet v. Maryland,167 decided in 1990 under the Supreme Court's
liberty-privacy cases outlined here, including Bowers. In Schochet, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland reversed the conviction of a single man, holding on the
basis of those cases that the state statute criminalizing fellatio was
unconstitutional as applied to private and noncommercial sexual acts between
consenting but unmarried heterosexual adults.168 Indeed, when the State of
Georgia attempted to enforce that statute against married persons a few years after
Bowers-in 1989-the Georgia state courts invoked Griswold to invalidate the
165 In Lawrence, the majority concluded that "Justice Stevens' analysis, in our view,
should have been controlling in Bowers and should control here." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
166 See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (2003). This sodomy statute predates
Lawrence as well as Bowers, having been enacted in 1973. In carving out a legal ghetto for the
containment and suppression of sexual minorities, the Texas legislature thus anticipated the
Bowers' justices similar act of marginalization.
167 580 A.2d 176 (Md. App. 1990).
168 Id. at 177 (emphasis added). For a more comprehensive survey of life for sexual
minorities under de jure heterosexist supremacy in the years around and immediately after
Bowers, see Valdes, Cultural Warriors, supra note 13, at 1423 n.57 and sources cited therein
(surveying the social and legal condition of sexual minorities in the years before and after the
Bowers ruling).
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very same sodomy statute embraced by the Bowers justices in 1986.169 By the
end of the 1980s, as these and similar cases make clear, Bowers' equality
anomaly had come into full bloom. And with it came a free license to the tyranny
of majoritarian rule that had been judicially issued from the very portico that
promises "Equal Justice for All."' 170
169 In Moseley v. Esposito, Georgia Superior Court Judge Robert Castellani set aside a
conviction for sodomy between married couples and granted a writ of habeas corpus to secure
the release of a married man imprisoned under the same statute challenged in Bowers. Citing
Bowers, Judge Castellani proclaimed that "the petitioner's right to marital and domestic privacy
has been violated by the sodomy law as applied to him." See Final Order, Moseley v. Esposito,
Civ Action No. 89-6897-1, Ga. Sup. Ct., DeKalb at 4-5 (Ga. Sept. 6, 1989) (copy on file with
author).
170 The standard judicial line to dejure discrimination in the Bowers period is illustrated
by the infamous opinion in Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987), an Equal
Protection challenge to the FBI's anti-gay personnel policies. Referring to Bowers' blessing of
Georgia's sodomy statute as applied to Michael Hardwick, the Padula court declared that
"there can hardly be more palpable discrimination against a class than making the conduct that
defines the class criminal." Id. at 103. If the Bowers justices were willing to bless the most
"palpable discrimination" possible against sexual minorities, how could lower court judges do
any less? Thus, Bowers' blessing of homophobic criminal statutes under substantive Due
Process became an increasingly routine justification for blessing homophobic policies and
practices under Equal Protection. That convenient bottom line was repeated time and again in
various factual and doctrinal scenarios until federal courts became a recognized hostile
environment for sexual minorities, and for civil rights claimants more generally. For a more
complete discussion of this and related cases, see Francisco Valdes, Sexual Minorities in the
Military: Charting the Constitutional Frontiers of Status and Conduct, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV.
384 (1994) (reviewing the cases blessing homophobic laws and policies based on the distinction
between status and conduct). The historical (and current) vulnerability of members of sexual
minorities to de jure discrimination is compiled in Developments in the Law: Sexual
Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1508 (1989); see also Patricia A. Cain, Same-Sex
Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, I LAW & SExuALITY 97 (1991) (describing tax code
disparities based on the formal exclusion from marriage); Barbara J. Cox, Alternative Families:
Obtaining Traditional Family Benefits Through Litigation, Legislation and Collective
Bargaining, 2 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1986) (elaborating an early effort to dismantle the web of
detriments flowing from the formal exclusion from marriage).
Over time, and in a remarkable display of federalism as anti-subordination practice, sexual
minority advocates went before state courts to plead claims based on state constitutions and
laws. See, e.g., Valdes, Cultural Warriors, supra note 13, at 1435 n. 102-07 and sources cited
therein (discussing state courts and battles in the culture wars). With increasing social activism
and sophistication, sexual minorities accumulated cultural and legal gains in the form of legal
reform and social accommodation despite the onslaughts of cultural warfare-a progression
that Lawrence notes, and upon which it relies, to dispose of Bowers as relevant or viable law.
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 570-77 (reviewing social and legal developments since Bowers).
Like Lawrence itself, many of these gains are due, at least in part, to the efforts of the
multifaceted sexual minority movements that arose in response to Bowers and other sources of
societal homophobia. See infra note 197 and sources cited therein (discussing sexual minority
activism before and after Bowers).
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Thus, the "real" Equal Protection problem in Lawrence was not simply
Texas' statutory classification but the Court's self-inflicted anomaly in Bowers,
which virtually dictated that precise line of legislative classification. O'Connor's
concurrence focuses entirely on the former without accounting at all for the latter:
when Texas outlawed specifically same-sex "sodomy" while giving cross-sex
sodomy free rein in 1973, it was of course in gross violation of both the literal text
and social values of the Equal Protection Clause; yet, in all fairness, by 1986, that
was all left open to it by privacy's fitful journey from Griswold to Bowers.1 71
Unless the current justices simply intended to use Lawrence as a tactical
opportunity to personally endorse and reiterate Bowers and further entrench the
anomaly it had spawned, which they apparently could not bring themselves to do
with a straight face, the substantive challenge facing the Court was this: whether
to ratchet down constitutional protection for cross-sex relations on the basis of
Bowers, or to ratchet them up for same-sex relations on the basis of Griswold,
Eisenstadt and Carey. Either way, the effect would be to equalize the formal
status of the majority and minority under the law, and to end the glaring anomaly
bestowed by Bowers' juxtaposition against Griswold, Eisenstadt and Carey.
Lawrence thereby comes into view as an equality case in some irreducible and
inevitable ways.
With this background in focus, it becomes clear that the "privacy" versus
"equality" tensions embedded in the Lawrence opinions stem quite directly from
the situation that Bowers set up and that Eisenstadt and Carey had avoided: if
after Griswold and progeny the Constitution protected marital "privacy" because
the acts taken within that relationship were deemed core identity-building choices
and practices, then a withholding of Equal Protection of the law from similarly
situated but unmarried persons would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. And if the right acknowledged in Griswold therefore
vests in all individuals, the next question of course becomes whether "all" really
means all. The Eleventh Circuit in Hardwick had no difficulty in seeing the
analytical pitfalls thus presented and avoided them by simply saying that, under
the precedents at that time, all meant all. But the five members of the Supreme
Court in Bowers who ruled to the contrary blinded themselves to those pitfalls,
thereby giving rise to the anomaly faced finally in Lawrence. This was the
jurisprudential thicket into which Lawrence self-consciously strode.
4. Ending the Anomaly: Restoring the Equality ofLiberty-Privacy
Under these circumstances, the granting of certiorari was bound to be hugely
intriguing to all observers. Having agreed to hear Lawrence, the Court effectively
required itself to confront the anomaly that some of its predecessors had foisted
on the nation in 1986. In electing to face this situation, the current justices had
171 See supra note 166 (on the origins and enactment of the Texas statute).
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two initial choices: first, simply to look the other way and ratify the embarrassing
anomaly explicitly or, second, to revisit the juxtaposition of the key precedents
that had created it. If the latter, the Court encountered a secondary set of choices:
which of the key precedents would it revisit, and how? In these secondary
choices, the Lawrence justices either would have to revisit Griswold, Eisenstadt
and Carey to retract (some of) the constitutional immunity recognized in those
cases for cross-sex relations and render them "equally" vulnerable to state
regulation on par with same-sex relations, or alternatively, revisit Bowers to make
same-sex relations equally "private" and invulnerable to state regulation on par
with cross-sex relations. If the anomaly was to end at all, either cross-sex
regulations must be adjusted downward to Bowers' embrace of majoritarian
moralism or same-sex regulations finally must give way to the privacy rights
recognized in Griswold and Eisenstadt as vesting in all individuals. This was, in
fact, the main point of the Stevens dissent in Bowers. 172
All three of these possible choices came freighted with complexity, but it
seems that the former was the least likely because the acute and increasing
untenability of Bowers' equality anomaly was apparent to all five justices who
joined in the majority opinion. This recognition is indicated in their brief and
cryptic response to O'Connor's concurrence, in which Kennedy's opinion for the
Court explains that an Equal Protection analysis could not suffice under the
circumstances of the case. Without providing specific reasoning, the Court
responded to O'Connor by noting: "That is a tenable argument, but we conclude
the instant case requires us to address whether Bowers itself has continuing
validity."'173 Two reasons, one implicit and one explicit, compelled that
conclusion: the implicit one was avoiding aggravation of the equality anomaly, to
which the Lawrence Court alludes, and the explicit one was acknowledging the
social function of sodomy statutes, which Lawrence incisively details. 174
Lawrence effectively required the Court to declare conclusively whether the
anomaly created by Bowers in light of Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe and Carey
"really" represented the substance of constitutional law. If so, Texas was right. If
not, something about the Court's own handiwork was wrong.
It therefore should be no big surprise that Lawrence's main potential benefits
correspond to its dismantlement of the Bowers' regime. Most pertinent to this
172 See supra Part ll.A.3.b (discussing Stevens' Bowers dissent).
173 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574-75.
174 "Were we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause some might
question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct
both between same-sex and different-sex participants." Id. at 575. In other words, an Equal
Protection holding would invite state actions precisely like Georgia's facially neutral statute in
Bowers, which had applied across the board despite the Bowers' majority's obsession with the
same-sex variety. With that scenario before them, the sound and efficient course of action for
the justices in Lawrence would be to do now what an Equal Protection ruling would require of
them later.
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outcome of course is the ending of the equality anomaly. But in so doing, the
Lawrence justices more broadly have also vindicated the "compendious notion"
of privacy displayed uniformly in the facts and outcomes of the liberty-privacy
cases beginning in 1923 and denominated as such by Harlan's Poe dissent in
1961. Moreover, in so doing, the Lawrence majority substantively and
methodologically vindicated the flexible Due Process analysis that Harlan's Poe
framework had derived from the then-existing precedents, and which subsequent
judges had employed to avoid literalistic pronouncements until Bowers' abrupt
interruption arrested further developments in liberty-privacy. 175 By wholly
repudiating Bowers, Lawrence manages to breathe new life into both the
Fourteenth Amendment as a viable constitutional provision and the Supreme
Court as an institution capable of "building" due process jurisprudence coherently
based on earlier liberty-privacy precedents.
If we forget about all of this quite relevant background, perhaps we can make
sense of O'Connor's insistent focus on equal protection in her Lawrence
concurrence. But because O'Connor midwived the anomaly's birthing in 1986,
we must suppose that she personally remembers and knows about this
background and its pitfalls.' 76 Perhaps one day we will receive an explanation
from Justice O'Connor for this odd maneuver in the same way that we received a
belated explanation from Justice Powell for the odd result in Bowers.177 For the
moment, however, and in the midst of Lawrence's apparent ambivalence, we can
celebrate one solid gain both for the social good of sexual minorities and for the
institutional legitimacy of the Supreme Court: Lawrence ends the glaring
anomaly that Bowers created.' 78
175 See supra notes 50-65 and accompanying text (discussing Harlan's Poe dissent).
176 O'Connor was part of the Bowers majority in 1986 that constructed the Equal
Protection anomaly described above. See supra Part II.A.3.a (discussing the Bowers majority
and their opinion in that case).
177 Even the story behind the Bowers decision made it increasingly a laughable artifact
undermining the institutional legitimacy of the Court. The now-famous story begins with
Justice Powell's vote-switch to uphold the Georgia statute and his absurd rationale for that
change of mind after voting the other way during the judge's conference on the case-
including, almost incredibly, his sincere belief that he had never met a homosexual during his
life when, in fact, one of his law clerks at the time was a gay man. See JEFFRIES, supra note 149,
at 521-24 (describing the decision); MURDOCH & PRICE, infra note 197, at 307-08. The story
concludes, of course, with Powell's courageous and candid post-retirement admission before a
law student forum at New York University that he had erred in that fateful last-minute vote
switch. See Aaron Epstein, Ex-Justice Says He Erred in '86 Gay Ruling, MiAMi HERALD, Oct.
26, 1990, at 19A; Ex-Justice Powell Regrets '86 Ruling on Gays, S.F. CHRoN., Oct. 30, 1990, at
A4; Anand Agneshwar, Ex-Justice Says He May Have Been Wrong, NAT. L.J., Nov. 5, 1990, at
3.
178 Moreover, in the process of doing so, Lawrence further made plain that the state may
unduly deprive "liberty" through discriminatory laws and selectively applied policies as well as
through a blanket imposition of oppressive regulation on all: state action deprives persons of
"liberty" either through a blanket impingement of rights and freedoms, such as those associated
[Vol. 65: 13411388
ANOMALIES, WART AND ALL
III. LESSONS FROM LA WRENCE: SOCIAL STRUGGLE, INSTITUTIONAL
PREDICAMENT AND DOCTRINAL RE/CONSTRUCTION
Why now? Why, in the midst of unabated kulturkampf, should Lawrence
come down as it did? Many possible reasons have been proffered, 179 and will
continue to be. Until we hear credible explanations from institutional insiders,
8 0
we are left to speculation, inference, and the like. Here, then, I simply add my
own to supplement others'. As with the other portions of this Article, the effort
here is to help construct meanings for Lawrence that not only make social sense
but also make for social justice.181
A. Cultural Evolution and Institutional Predicament
Before Lawrence, a growing crisis of near-cynicism had been inspired by the
justices' pliant pose, if not outright complicity, in the face of intensifying
kulturkampf. The crisis fed on a growing perception that the current justices had
shown a remarkable incapacity to fulfill traditional notions of principled
adjudication, and instead had set out to inscribe an "anti-antidiscrimination
agenda" onto the pages of the U.S. Reports.' 82 This sense of heightened judicial
politicization in turn helped to prompt the emergence of a scholarly field based on
the "attitudinal model" of adjudication-a model that tracks the ideology of
judicial acts with the ideology of judicial actors to document an unmistakable-
perhaps shocking-correlation between the two. The findings bring into open
question whether any distinction in fact exists between "law" and "politics" even
though much of judicial legitimacy in the United States depends on the perceived
and actual existence of precisely this distinction.' 83 Thus, by the end of the
with "privacy," or through strategic or selective deprivations that impinge on "equality"
interests. And these deprivations, Lawrence shows, take place whether the deprivation is
deemed "fundamental" or not and regardless of the "level of scrutiny" described or applied. See
generally Hunter, Living with Lawrence, supra note 7, at 1116-17.
179 For a prominent and thoughtful example, see Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas:
The "Fundamental Right'" that Dare not Speak its Name, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1893 (2004).
180 The main example most pertinent to this Article, of course, is Powell's rueful
reflections on his decisive vote in Bowers after retiring from the Court. See supra note 177.
181 See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing the limited but focused purposes
of this Article).
182 See Rubenfeld, supra note 20 (critiquing the current justices' "anti-antidiscrimination
agenda").
183 For a more substantive description of this "attitudinal model" for the analysis of
judicial opinions, see generally Valdes, Jurisprudence of Backlash, supra note 14, at 275. The
basic conclusions of this field were more recently corroborated by a study of the cases argued
during the 2002 Supreme Court Tenn. Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court
Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court
Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 1150 (2004).
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century, the bents and acts of the current backlash bloc on the high Court' 84
increasingly seemed reminiscent to many observers of the conservative activism
mounted in the 1930s by the justices in control of that tribunal two generations
ago. 185
Indeed, those five justices' unprecedented meddling in the presidential
election of 2000 and their selection of one political candidate for installation into
power had reversed the court-packing dynamics of the culture wars, wherein
politicians pack the bench rather than the other way around. 186 The audacity of
that spectacle generated reports of ruptured relations on the Supreme Court bench
and, more telling, prompted mild mannered observers to conclude publicly that
the justices had embarked on a campaign to name their own successors-to pack
the Court themselves, so to speak.' 87 When Lawrence presented itself in 2003,
the Supreme Court was an institution arguably on the brink of crisis self-inflicted
by the stunning string of willful pronouncements racked up by the same backlash
bloc of five during the past decade,188 as exemplified perhaps most chillingly by
the incredible decision of those same five to hand-pick the next (and present)
occupant of the White House.1 89 These, and other increasingly acute concerns
over institutional legitimacy aroused by patent judicial transgressions blurring
conventional lines between politics and law, had to be known to them.
In fact, precisely those kinds of concerns evidently were uppermost in their
minds eleven years earlier, in their 1992 opinions in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, when the very same set of justices (except for two) exchanged heated
barbs regarding another front-burner issue of the culture wars: women's
reproductive rights. 190 Likening the Casey ruling to the notorious approval of
184 The five members of the backlash bloc include: Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, O'Connor
and Kennedy. For a more complete explication of this quintet as a bloc that drives backlash
jurisprudence, see Valdes, We Have Held, supra note 11.
185 See supra note 40 and sources cited therein (discussing the 1930s in light of today's
backlash and retrenchment through judicial activism).
186 See supra notes 13-21 and accompanying text (discussing the culture wars).
187 Bruce Ackerman, The Court Packs Itself, AM. PROSPECT, Feb. 12, 2001, at 48 (noting
that the decision in the Gore litigation was "not the first time in history that the Supreme Court
has made a decision that called its findamental legitimacy into question," but that this time was
unique because of the direct meddling in electoral politics at the highest level).
188 For a more detailed exposition of these cases and their patterns, see Valdes, We Have
Held, supra note 11.
189 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see also ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME
INJUSTICE: HOw THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED ELECTION 2000 (2001).
190 505 U.S. 853 (1992). In Casey, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted a statute curbing
the reproductive choices previously available to Pennsylvania women under Roe v. Wade, the
1974 ruling that recognized reproductive freedom as an element of the "privacy" right
acknowledged in Griswold and Eisenstadt. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text
(discussing Roe). Since 1974, as Casey illustrates, Roe has come to represent ground zero in the
jurisprudential dimensions of the culture wars that define the environment in which these
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slavery in the Dred Scott case, our friend Scalia savaged the joint opinion of the
Court authored by his fellow Republican appointees-Kennedy, O'Connor and
Souter-for failing to live up to their purpose; in other words, for failing to follow
the culture wars' script and, in that instance, (finally) overturn Roe v. Wade as
constitutional precedent.191 Drawing a line between the judicial obligation to
"reasoned judgment" and their political acquiescence to the forces of backlash
demanding Roe's rejection, their response was to invoke the law/politics
distinction.192 Not coincidentally, those same justices were crucial to
Lawrence.193 In this instance, it seems, they felt the same extremist dynamics at
work, and once again elected to buck the demands of backlash politics.
So Lawrence (partially) breaks the backlash pattern and agenda, but why?
Perhaps Bowers' venomous mean-spiritedness was just too much for them to
stomach; the embodiment of its social ugliness in this case was too much for them
to bless or, apparently, even to ignore. Perhaps Lawrence also can be seen, as
with Romer v. Evans, as part of a typically fitful pattern in "normal"
jurisprudential evolution, in which the arc formed by Griswold through Carey but
interrupted by Bowers and other culture war cases is eventually resumed in cases
like Lawrence.194 Perhaps some combination of these and other factors explain
this curious timing. Perhaps some truth resides in this speculation, and perhaps
not. Perhaps one day, after retirement, some of today's justices will provide a
glimpse into these choices akin to Justice Powell's in the case of his vote in
Bowers.1 95 In the meantime, social change and institutional predicament may
provide some insight.
This account begins with a Court aware of its own limits and that it may have
overstepped them based not only on the skeptical reactions to its aggressive
activism in recent culture war cases since and including Bowers, but also on the
changed social facts surrounding sexuality and its regulation through law recited
in the ruling itself; these recitations display a Court keenly aware that the world
controversies are litigated and adjudicated. Thus, Pennsylvania's legislative act was a frontal
challenge to that precedent-along with the similar acts of other state legislatures around the
country. Not surprisingly, the Court was inveighed to view Pennsylvania's action as the
opportunity to jettison Roe. The justices pointedly declined, even though the legislature clearly
had acted in the name of majoritarian morality, while also scaling back Roe's protection of
private reproductive choice. For further discussion, see Valdes, We Have Held, supra note 11.
Ginsburg and Breyer, appointed in the following couple of years to succeed White and
Blackmun, respectively, are the only personnel changes between the two cases.
191 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 1001 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
192 Id. at 849.
193 In Lawrence, as in Casey, the two swing votes that oftentimes enable the triumph of
backlash opted out of the bloc: Kennedy wrote the opinion of the Court in Lawrence while
O'Connor concurred on equal protection grounds.
194 See supra note 13 (discussing Romer).
195 See supra note 177 and accompanying text (discussing Powell's regrets over his tie-
breaking vote in Bowers).
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had literally changed around them, around and despite Bowers. 196 These social
facts and changes in turn established the doctrinal basis for reconsidering Bowers
as viable precedent under Casey's analytical scheme; these social changes made
Bowers increasingly an anachronism, depicting an out-of-touch tribunal rendering
itself increasingly irrelevant to contemporary society by choosing to remain stuck
in increasingly discredited dogmas. The changed social facts, of course, in turn
had been brought about in great measure by the emergence of the multifaceted
sexual minority social movement that struggled against Bowers' injustices with
education, litigation, agitation and mobilization. 197 In this account, therefore,
196 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 570-80.
197 Since the celebrated Stonewall Riots of 1969 in New York City, sexual minorities of
various stripes (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgendered, etc.) have mounted a civil rights struggle
for "equal rights" that vividly has helped to display on a daily basis the absurdity of Bowers'
depiction of, and obsession with, homosexuals and our forms of sodomy-an embarrassment
that also put on display the Court's own irrelevance in the construction of sexual minorities as
viable social groups domestically and internationally. For a personalized account of the
Stonewall Riots, see MARTIN DUBERMAN, STONEWALL (1993). For a more comprehensive
account of the lesbian and gay "liberation movement" see ERIC MARCUS, MAKING HISTORY:
THE STRUGGLE FOR GAY AND LESBIAN EQUAL RIGHTS, 1945-1990 (1992). See also GAY
AMERICAN HISTORY: LESBIANS AND GAY MEN IN THE U.S.A. (Jonathan Katz ed. 1976)
(compiling historical materials). See generally note 66 and sources cited therein (on sexual
liberation politics). More recently, the successful campaign in Vermont for "civil unions"
undertaken under Bowers' shadow serves as a microcosm of this larger, multifaceted and
continuing sexual minority civil rights struggle. See DAVID MOATS, CIVIL WARS: A BATTLE
FOR GAY MARRIAGE (2004). For a comprehensive account of this ongoing struggle focusing on
the Supreme Court specifically, see JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY
MEN AND LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME COURT (2001). See also Francisco Valdes, Queers,
Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender" and "Sexual
Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 36 n.86 (1995) (citing the
literature extensively).
Lawrence thus displays the significance of coalitional legal and political work as methods
toward constitutional reform and social transformation. The remarkably diverse array of amicus
briefs submitted to the Court reflects the long years of hard work in coalition-building that took
place in the seventeen years separating Bowers and Lawrence. Those briefs, and the sectors of
society that they represented, made it more difficult than usual for insulated judges to opt for the
comforts of formalistic distance from the lived realities presented by the cases. Those briefs,
and the realistic understandings of the issues they projected, underscored for the judges that
their predecessors' abuse of power in Bowers remained an unforgotten stain upon the reputation
of the institution they had inherited and now controlled. Those briefs made plain that society
had overtaken Bowers and had thereby raised the stakes for the Court in intellectual, cultural
and political terms. See generally Harcourt, supra note 7, at 7 (discussing the "surprising
coalitions, the telling alliances, [and] the strange bedfellows" in the Lawrence litigation, as
reflected in the amicus briefs, "in order to properly understand Lawrence-and other sex and
cultural wars").
Coalitonal work, of course, has been a central aspect of many works produced in recent
years by critical legal scholars. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, The Struggle for Civil Rights: The
Needfor, and Impediments to, Political Coalitions Among and Within Minority Groups, 63 LA.
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social struggle-and the social changes it helped to catalyze-contributed
substantially to the Court's institutional predicament: how to free itself of acute
embarrassments spanning multiple interests, yet all rooted in or exemplified by
Bowers and its consequences-its text, its logic, and its subsequent application by
judges and lawmakers from coast to coast.
In this account, Casey plays a crucial role because it had previously laid
down four broad categories for "principled" reversals of Supreme Court
precedents. Those four categories included precedents overtaken by changed
social circumstances. 198 Here, the Lawrence Court explained, one of Casey's
categories applied to Bowers: "In Casey we noted that when a Court is asked to
overrule a precedent recognizing a constitutional liberty interest, individual or
societal reliance on the existence of that liberty cautions with particular strength
against reversing course." 199 In this instance, of course, it goes without saying
that Bowers was not a precedent "recognizing a constitutional liberty interest" but
rather, to the contrary, a precedent emphatically denying one.200 As such, by
definition it could not have induced any reliance on the consequently non-existent
L. REv. 759 (2003) (discussing the important role of coalitions in civil rights struggles); Kevin
R. Johnson, Some Thoughts on the Future of Latino Legal Scholarship, 2 HARV. LATINO L.
REv. 101 (1997) (focusing on the challenges facing LatCrit theory regarding coalitional work);
George A. Martinez, African-Americans, Latinos, and the Construction of Race: Toward an
Epistemic Coalition, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 213 (1998) (urging Latinas/os, Blacks and
other groups of color to coalesce around "race" and our collective, cumulative knowledge of
white supremacy); Mari J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of
Coalition, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1183, 1189 (1991) (urging antisubordination analyses to "ask the
other question" as a means of theorizing across single-axis group boundaries); Ediberto Roman,
Common Ground: Perspectives on Latina-Latino Diversities, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REv. 483,
484-91 (1997) (elaborating commonalities upon which Latinas/os may build a sense of
constructive collectivity and urging Latinas/os to focus on our similarities rather than our
differences as a way of promoting intra-group justice and solidarity); Julie A. Su & Eric K.
Yamamoto, Critical Coalitions: Theory and Praxis, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW
CRITICAL RACE THEORY 379 (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002); Eric K. Yamamoto, Conflict
and Complicity: Justice Among Communities of Color, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 495 (1997)
(analyzing inter-group grievances and relations among groups of color). With some irony, then,
political, intellectual, cultural, legal and other aspects of the sexual minority movements
inspired by Bowers' insults and injuries aptly have illustrated the importance of social
contestation and coalitional solidarity in the pursuit of social justice through legal reformation.
As an example of coalitional work and its potential in a particular legal context--civil rights
litigation and constitutional law-the Lawrence experience counsels more, much more, of the
same--especially if we are to provide emancipatory coherence and antisubordination meaning
to Lawrence in the months and years to come.
198 Casey, 505 U.S. at 854-61.
199 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577.
200 See supra Part lI.A.3 (discussing Bowers' outcome).
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interest.20 1 Instead, Bowers was a monument to a social ideology in decline:
fundamentalist homophobia. Its ideology, as the social developments in the U.S.
and Europe cited by Lawrence help to illustrate, steadily had been overtaken by
social changes induced in great part, as already noted, by collective social
struggle.202 Under Casey, Bowers was a precedent that had become irrelevant and
anachronistic both as an expression of constitutional principle and as a reflection
of social reality. As the Lawrence majority seemingly recognized, there was, by
this time, no saving Bowers-except by flagrant judicial fiat. Thus, under this
account the Lawrence Court was embarrassed into action on cultural, institutional,
political and intellectual circumstances that cumulatively and increasingly eroded
its only source of authority: the actual and/or perceived legitimacy of its
pronouncements as products of principle rather than politics. Bowers most
definitely had both epitomized and fueled this institutional devolution under the
sway of backlash jurisprudence.
Under this account, then, the Court was embarrassed in cultural terms by the
social changes that overtook Bowers' quaint depiction, yet vicious trivialization,
of sexual minority families.203 In similar and related terms, the Court was
institutionally embarrassed by the growing international spectacle of other nations
and legal systems pointedly going in the opposite direction-notably, the ones in
Europe, which are the only ones that North Americans consider equal or superior
to their own-and effectively signaling their disassociation from Bowers' patent,
even hysterical, homophobia.20 4 The Court also was politically embarrassed by
the increasingly fierce and unseemly experiments in structural bigotry through
majoritarian policymaking that Bowers in fact had entrenched as a fixture of
public life on scandalously thin grounds-experiments exemplified by
Colorado's Amendment Two, which sought to declare sexual minorities
permanent pariahs beyond the reach of any realistic law reform effort.20 5 Whether
or not these converging embarrassments cumulatively had any impact on the
justices, it seems clear that Bowers had spawned an increasingly untenable
institutional situation that left the current justices in a tightening predicament;
most tellingly, the Court's own opinion exudes awareness of the gaping
201 The only type of reliance interest possible under these circumstances is reliance on a
license to practice homophobia with social and legal impunity--hardly a "constitutional liberty
interest."
202 See supra note 197 and accompanying text (on sexual minority activism in law and
society). The social changes cited by the Court-and their doctrinal work-thus illustrate the
salience of social struggle along multiple fronts, including litigation and agitation, in helping to
bring about law reform, even at the constitutional plane.
203 Lawrence acknowledges that Bowers "demeans" Queer lives, identities, relations and
families. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
2 0 4 See id. at 576-77.
205 See supra note 13 (discussing Romer and Colorado's Amendment Two).
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discontinuities between Bowers and just about every other source of knowledge
or opinion on the matter.206
If so, the current Court perhaps was intellectually embarrassed by the
"equality anomaly" that Bowers had constructed in its obsessive quest to shut
down "fundamental rights" and gay rights in one fell swoop-an anomaly that
effectively beckoned the kind of scenario confronted in Lawrence.207 The brevity
and certitude of its response to O'Connor's equal protection analysis certainly
indicates a keen sense of its fundamental inadequacy. 208 While necessarily
inconclusive, the convergence of these embarrassments in this account compelled
some kind of self-help, some kind of rescue action before the Court and its
functions became increasingly suspect to all except the most diehard
backlashers-yet the justices' capacity to act was constrained by the politics and
forces that they themselves enable and embody.20 9 Though the inferences drawn
in this sketch are necessarily open to further refinement, Lawrence, in this view,
reads very much like an act of institutional self-correction to remove a major
source of erosion in the legitimacy of that institution and its work product.
B. Beyond Lawrence: Toward the Liberty of Desire- "Dignity " and Sexual Self-
Determination?
To the extent that Lawrence merely or mostly reflects the social changes of
the past two decades, the case points both to the power of social action as well as
to the limits of formal law as a tool of social justice: what Bowers had sought to
preserve-the subordination and subjection of Queer identities and relations-
was effectively repudiated by large segments of contemporary society in myriad
cultural contexts and everyday circumstances.210 Today's justices now have
withdrawn the Court's doctrinaire opposition to social evolution and ratified the
206 As examples, Lawrence points to critiques of Bowers within the United States,
international developments at odds with that case, and Justice Stevens' Bowers dissent.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574-78.
207 The Texas statute predates Bowers, but Bowers' equality anomaly allows precisely
only this type of sodomy criminal statute. See supra Part II.A.3.c.
208 See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's response to
the O'Connor concurrence).
209 Hence, the ambivalence-whether apparent or actual. See supra notes 1-24 and
accompanying text.
210 This observation raises a question that is beyond the scope of this Article: How is it
that "society" came to "tolerate" gays even as "democratic majorities" continued to legislate
oppression through legislation and, sometimes, even referendum? This very query is brought
into sharp relief by the adoption of anti-same-sex marriage rules by referendum during the 2004
electoral cycle. See, e.g., T.R. Reid, Same-Sex Marriage Measures Succeed; Bans in Several
States Supported by Wide Margins, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2004, at A25; Sarah Kershaw,
Constitutional Bans on Same-Sex Marriage Gain Widespread Support in 10 States, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 3, 2003, at P9.
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cultural choice that took place while that institution had remained willfully stuck
in Bowers' dogmas. In doing so, this Court has shown how law can learn from
society.
Thus, perhaps what is most important from a substantive or doctrinal
perspective is that Lawrence and its antecedents recognize-sometimes tacitly,
sometimes explicitly-that sexuality and intimacy play fundamental and complex
roles in the real-life formation of humanity and society. More than any others
decided by the Supreme Court, these cases invite piercings of law's general
negation of sexual desire and its expression as cognizable human interests quite
apart from the traditionalist focus on procreation. The unmistakable recognition in
these cases of sexual needs and relations as legitimate and, in some instances,
even elemental, provides a jurisprudential platform from which to counter the
legal profession's traditionally narrow focus on abstracted logic and ostensible
reason. This platform is socially salutary because the law's standard narrowness
oftentimes has trivialized other aspects, needs and interests of living human
beings-complexities that in whole might be described as "personhood," and that,
in some key ways, still elude the capacity of reason to map or explain.2 11
Indeed, Lawrence responds to the regulation of sexuality with a recognition
that real-life sexual relations are a fluid and perhaps extra-rational dimension of
personhood. Lawrence recognizes sexuality as a means through which individuals
in fact do "realize" themselves via their intimate interactions with consenting
others of their choice. It is this life journey, the ongoing search for "meaning" and
individual personhood, in part through sexual interaction that Lawrence
acknowledges is protected by liberty.
The "liberty" encompassing "privacy" in Lawrence, therefore, is one that
protects autonomy and privacy in individual choices over intimate relations,
associations and experiences precisely in order to provide the social space for
individuals to become individuated. Lawrence effectively emphasizes that the
individual interest protected by "liberty" in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment cannot mean, in any realistic and socially functional way,
merely the "final" arrival at the idealized destination of formal marriage to fulfill
the obligation of procreation, but also the sometimes transitory relationships
tested along every individual's search for companionship and fulfillment through
sexual bondings with consenting others. In fact, the "relationship" in Lawrence
was, on the record, perhaps a simple one-time encounter;212 and even if so, as
Lawrence demonstrates, its ephemeral qualities did not distinguish it from
"marriage" because both-the "date" as well as the marriage-are every-day
expressions of human bonding through sexual intimacy. At its best, Lawrence
teaches that the initial or even casual encounter is as much a part of the human
211 See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REv. 737 (1989)
(elaborating on the notion of personhood in relationship to privacy doctrine).
212 For more on the facts of Lawrence, see Berta E. Hemandez-Truyol, Querying
Lawrence, 65 Ohio St. L.J. 1151 (2004).
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quest for self-meaning through intimate bonds as the long-term relationship that
may, in time, ripen from it.
Thus Lawrence-though decidedly a product of the culture wars-emanates
an apparent ambivalence because it does much of the same as Griswold and its
progeny, but it does it very differently, hence producing a very different outcome
as compared to Bowers. Its positive potential lies in this difference. Yes,
Lawrence remains rhetorically moored to the traditionalist instrumentalism of
privacy doctrine, even as it confirms the textual centrality of liberty in this
analysis. As noted above, therein lie many of Lawrence's significant
limitations. 213 But Lawrence also substantively recognizes and embraces the
social value of functionally equivalent "relationships"--including those of the
same-sex variety-which Bowers refused even to contemplate. Rather than grant
majoritarian license to demean Queer lives, Lawrence mandates the law's
protection of Queer dignity. 214
213 See supra notes 1-24 and accompanying text (discussing Lawrence and some of its
predecessors, including their limitations).
214 The choice of "dignity" to denote the individual interest protected by liberty-privacy is
notable because this choice of terminology invokes the language of human rights, a discourse
oftentimes excluded from "domestic" legal regimes, especially under the dictates of backlash
jurisprudence. Lawrence, of course, is an exception to this exclusion in federal constitutional
law. 539 U.S. at 574 (relying on decisions of the European Court of Human Rights). For
another remarkable exception, this time in state constitutional law, see Vicki C. Jackson,
Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and Transnational Constitutional
Discourse, 65 MONT. L. REV. 15, 21-27 (2004) (tracing the Human Dignity provision of the
1972 Montana Constitution to a similar provision in the 1952 Constitution of Puerto Rico). The
1952 Constitution of Puerto Rico, in turn, incorporated the analogous provision in the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
From the defeat of the Nazis, to international declarations of the centrality of human
dignity, to a constitutionally anomalous territory becoming a commonwealth of the United
States, to the State of Montana, the idea of a constitutional right to human dignity has
traveled through a set of international and intra-national boundaries.
Id. at 26-27.
Given backlashers' domination of domestic law, Queer legal theorists have examined
international law and venues as alternative or supplementary means of achieving inclusion,
equality and dignity in formal as well as social terms. See, e.g., Berta Esperanza Hemandez-
Truyol, Building Bridges: Bringing International Human Rights Home, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 69
(1996); see also Laurence R. Helfer & Alice M. Miller, Sexual Orientation and Human Rights:
Toward a United States and Transnational Jurisprudence, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 61 (1996);
James D. Wilets, Using International Law to Vindicate the Civil Rights of Gays and Lesbians in
United States Courts, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 33 (1995); see generally THE GLOBAL
EMERGENCE OF GAY AND LESBIAN POLITICS: NATIONAL IMPRINTS OF A WORLDWIDE
MOVEMENT (Barry D. Adam et al. eds., 1999). For more on comparative constitutionalism
under the rule of kulturkampf backlash in contemporary law and policy, see Valdes, We Have
Held, supra note 11.
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More remarkably and importantly, Lawrence does so on facts that, on the
record, do not establish a "committed" or conventionally respectable relationship
to have existed. Thus, despite rhetoric to the contrary in the opinion, a considered
reading of the text and the facts strongly indicate that Lawrence does more than
simply validate same-sex relationships that mimic traditional "marriages."
Instead, Lawrence recognizes, first, the central role that sexual desires and
intimacies play in the development of individual personalities and, second, the
importance of sexual experimentation and choice in individuals' efforts to realize
and secure their sense of self.215 Though traditionally instrumentalist in their basic
conceptions of privacy and liberty, the precedents from Griswold to Lawrence,
and especially the latter, consequently provide the most proximate springboard
for more egalitarian conceptions of interlinked Fourteenth Amendment rights
sounding in privacy and liberty and equality to protect intimate associations from
majoritarian commandeering in the name of morality, utility and/or democracy.
Lawrence, as the progeny of Griswold and Carey, points to sexual self-
determination as an integral component of liberty-privacy-a right to self-
deternination specifically in sexual relations freeing individuals from the policy
regimes of moralistic majorities that would coerce "traditional" marriages and
demand procreation in the putative service of the state.216
IV. Conclusion
Lawrence brings constitutional law on sexual orientation into coherence with
the line and logic of cases decided pre-Bowers. Within the larger framing of the
social, cultural, institutional, political and intellectual considerations reflected in
215 In this way, Lawrence does exude a libertarian sense of the relationship between the
management of individuality and state power; Lawrence seems to recognize that Bowers was
and is a jurisprudential failure because it attempted to prevent humans from forming intimate
relationships with other consenting adults in "private" ways that prioritize self-realization over
social imperative. See generally, Barnett, supra note 7. Cf Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence
Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1140 (2004). Lawrence thus concedes what society had
recognized despite Bowers' insistence: that persons need not live chiefly to procreate in
satisfaction of coercive state preferences. Lawrence thereby makes possible what Bowers
attempted to make impossible: legal recognition of human sexuality and expression of desire as
substantive constitutional values-perhaps, even, the formal recognition of the right to sexual
self-determination. This recognition, ultimately, may be the main benefit to be drawn from the
meanings that Lawrence, over time, will take on. See supra Part lll.A on sexual self-
determination in and after Lawrence.
216 For early and insightful descriptions of this right, see Martha Chamallas, Consent,
Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 So. CAL. L. REV. 777 (1988); Mary C.
Dunlap, Toward Recognition of "A Right To Be Sexual", 7 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 245 (1982);
Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980). See also
Patricia A. Cain, "The Right To Be Sexual" (Revisited): Remembering Mary Dunlap, 19
BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 19 (2004) (memorializing Dunlap's death six months after Lawrence
buried Bowers, and in relationship to her long body of work on sexuality and the law).
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the opinion, Lawrence represents an affirmation that privacy, liberty and equality
indeed are fused by the Fourteenth Amendment, and that these values do indeed
apply to all individuals qua individuals regardless of "presumed beliefs" about
majoritarian moralism or current notions of "history and tradition." The
immediate result, therefore, is most welcome but significant portions of the
reasoning should give pause. The apparent rhetorical ambivalence of the opinion
is supremely susceptible to strategic manipulation because the expansive passages
explaining the result set the stage for a newly robust protection of intimate
associations freed of "traditional" bigotry and moralism while the constrictive
passages exalting "the confines of the home" and "private life" simultaneously set
the stage for "strict" interpretations of the opinion designed to curtail its
emancipatory potential and to preserve, as much as possible, the historical
hegemony of heterosexist supremacy in law and society.
In its more constrictive passages, Lawrence eerily echoes the traditionalist
instrumentalism found in Griswold and Eisenstadt: in both of those cases, the
justices justified their privacy rulings in terms that valorized the traditional
marriage and the home in which it idyllically nested. Read literally, one might
think that humans possess privacy rights only because marriage exists and must
be perpetuated. Read strictly, those opinions gave little relief to diverse
aspirations for alternative relationships or evolutionary arrangements. Moreover,
the past and present injustices integral to that institution remained hidden in those
opinions. But to give credence to the constrictive passages in Lawrence would
repeat many of the same mistakes based on Bowers that Lawrence itself debunks
in its more expansive passages.
In its more expansive passages, Lawrence sets the stage for future
accomplishments in substantive terms. Lawrence makes clear that "privacy" is
not a series of atomized dots marking isolated "acts" or "decisions" devoid of any
connection to the real-life meaning of such acts and decisions to an individual's
"liberty" to construct a self-conception. Rather, Lawrence confirms that the
"privacy" dots represented by Meyer and its successors provide the factual
settings for the recognition of these due process rights, but they do not stand apart,
in the form of "privacy," from equality and liberty; instead, all three are
interdependent. In plain and unequivocal terms enabled by critical method and
antisubordination grounding, Lawrence makes clear that Bowers, not Griswold or
Carey, was the discordant outlier in four score of Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence.
Thus, while apparently ambivalent on many points, Lawrence potentially
signals that, despite a decade or more of dormancy imposed by federal judges,
equality and privacy are not dead constitutional fields after all. Instead, the
previous privacy-liberty cases up to Carey, buttressed now by Lawrence, Romer
and (even) Casey, can provide a sturdy enough platform for resuming the nation-
building task interrupted by Bowers and its backlash brethren: liberating all
humans from the socio-sexual regimentation that traditionalist elites would
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enforce in perpetuity in the form of majoritarian bans like those challenged in
those and similar cases. Despite its rhetorical warts, the most concrete benefit
already accrued from Lawrence is the formal validation of Griswold and Carey,
and the formal downfall of Bowers' tyranny, especially in the midst of the furies
unleashed by two decades of ardent cultural warfare against traditionally
vulnerable social groups, including sexual minorities.
Lawrence thus illustrates and embodies both the power and the potential as
well as the limits and the pitfalls of law in a society formally committed to Equal
Justice for All-and even more earnestly committed to seeing itself as just and
good. Lawrence, as a result, can come to mean all or nothing. Lawrence, in the
end, will come to mean whatever we-and the future members of the Supreme
Court-decide, cumulatively, through our actions, writings and teachings. In the
end, the difference between all and nothing-the difference between a
substantively "compendious notion" of liberty-privacy and merely "isolated
points" of constitutional protection for individual life choices-may turn on us.
